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ABSTRACT
A BRICS Internet, the Euro Cloud, the Iranian “Halal” Internet:
Governments across the world eager to increase control over the World Wide
Web are tearing it apart. Iran seeks to develop an Internet free of Western
influences or domestic dissent. The Australian government places restrictions
on health data leaving the country. Russia requires personal information to be
stored domestically. Vietnam insists on a local copy of all Vietnamese data.
The last century’s nontariff barriers to goods have reappeared as firewalls
blocking international services. Legitimate global anxieties over surveillance
and security are justifying governmental measures that break apart the World
Wide Web, without enhancing either privacy or security.
The issue is critical to the future of international trade and development,
and even to the ongoing struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. Data
localization threatens the possibility of outsourcing services, whether to
Bangalore, Accra, Manila, or even Silicon Valley. The theory of this Article
expands the conversation about international Internet regulation from efforts
to prevent data from flowing in to a country through censorship, to include
efforts to prevent data from flowing out through data localization. A simple
formula helps demonstrate what is stake: censorship + data localization =
total control.
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INTRODUCTION
The era of a global Internet may be passing. Governments across the world
are putting up barriers to the free flow of information across borders. Driven
by concerns over privacy, security, surveillance, and law enforcement,
governments are erecting borders in cyberspace, breaking apart the World
Wide Web. The first generation of Internet border controls sought to keep
information out of a country—from Nazi paraphernalia to copyright infringing
material.1 The new generation of Internet border controls seeks not to keep
information out but rather to keep data in. Where the first generation was
relatively narrow in the information excluded, the new generation seeks to
keep all data about individuals within a country.
Efforts to keep data within national borders have gained traction in the
wake of revelations of widespread electronic spying by United States
intelligence agencies.2 Governments across the world, indignant at the recent
disclosures, have cited foreign surveillance as an argument to prevent data
from leaving their borders, allegedly into foreign hands.3 As the argument
1 See Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000,
D. 2000 inf. rap. 172, obs. J. Gomez, available at http://juriscom.net/2000/05/tgi-paris-refere-22-mai-2000uejf-et-licra-c-yahoo-inc-et-yahoo-france/, translation available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html (Daniel
Arthur Laprès, trans.); Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov.
20, 2000, JCP 2000, Actu., 2219, obs. J. Gomez (Fr.), available at http://juriscom.net/wp-content/documents/
tgiparis20001120.pdf, translation available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.html (Daniel Arthur Laprès,
trans.); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cotnre le Racisme et L’Antisemtisime, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (per curiam) (discussing the French proceedings and parallel proceedings in the United States). For a
domestic example, see Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), which was ostensibly designed
to require internet service providers to block access to foreign websites hosting copyright infringing materials.
2 The disclosures based on Edward Snowden’s documents began with the following article: Glenn
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013,
06.05 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. Earlier
accounts of the NSA’s global surveillance plans include James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED, Apr. 2012, at
78, available at http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/05/features/the-black-box. Such intelligence
gathering is hardly limited to the United States, of course. David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth,
China’s Army Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html (describing
hacking of United States computer networks, apparently from China); see also Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ
Taps Fibre-optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013, 12:23
EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (describing
United Kingdom surveillance of global communications).
3 See Bundesregierung, Merkel: Neue Projekte mit Frankreich [Merkel: New Projects with France],
YOUTUBE (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQo1mcyDvUg (showing German Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s discussion of European data protection); Max Smolaks, Russian Government Will Force
Companies to Store Citizen Data Locally, TECHWEEK EUR. (July 4, 2014, 17:22), http://www.techweekeurope.
co.uk/news/russian-government-will-force-companies-store-citizen-data-locally-148560 (noting that Russia’s
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goes, placing data in other nations jeopardizes the security and privacy of such
information. We define “data localization” measures as those that specifically
encumber the transfer of data across national borders. These measures take a
wide variety of forms—including rules preventing information from being sent
outside the country, rules requiring prior consent of the data subject before
information is transmitted across national borders, rules requiring copies of
information to be stored domestically, and even a tax on the export of data. We
argue here that data localization will backfire and that it in fact undermines
privacy and security, while still leaving data vulnerable to foreign surveillance.
Even more importantly, data localization increases the ability of governments
to surveil and even oppress their own populations.
Imagine an Internet where data must stop at national borders, examined to
see whether it is allowed to leave the country and possibly taxed when it does.
While this may sound fanciful, this is precisely the impact of various measures
undertaken or planned by many nations to curtail the flow of data outside their
borders. Countries around the world are in the process of creating Checkpoint
Charlies—not just for highly secret national security data but for ordinary data
about citizens. The very nature of the World Wide Web is at stake. We will
show how countries across the world have implemented or have planned
dramatic steps to curtail the flow of information outside their borders. By
creating national barriers to data, data localization measures break up the
World Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the globe.4
The Internet is a global network based on a protocol for interconnecting
computers without regard for national borders. Information is routed across
this network through decisions made autonomously and automatically at local
routers, which choose paths based largely on efficiency, unaware of political
borders.5 Thus, the services built on the Internet, from email to the World

“legal measure is widely seen as a response to reports about the intrusive surveillance practices of the US
National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s GCHQ”); Thomas K. Thomas, Route Domestic Net Traffic via
India Servers, NSA Tells Operators, HINDU BUS. LINE (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
industry-and-economy/info-tech/route-domestic-net-traffic-via-india-servers-nsa-tells-operators/article5022
791.ece (stating that India’s Deputy National Security Advisor has reportedly sought “ways to route domestic
Internet traffic via servers within the country,” and quoting an official who said that “[s]uch an arrangement
would limit the capacity of foreign elements to scrutinise intra-India traffic”).
4 See TIM BERNERS-LEE WITH MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND
ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 4 (1999) (describing a vision of a “single,
global information space”).
5 For a brief overview of the architecture of the Internet, see ETHAN ZUCKERMAN & ANDREW
MCLAUGHLIN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (2003), available at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldemocracy/internetarchitecture.pdf.
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Wide Web, pay little heed to national borders. Services such as cloud
computing exemplify this, making the physical locations for the storage and
processing of their data largely invisible to users. Data localization would
dramatically alter this fundamental architecture of the Internet.
Such a change poses a mortal threat to the new kind of international trade
made possible by the Internet—information services such as those supplied by
Bangalore or Silicon Valley.6 Barriers of distance or immigration restrictions
had long kept such services confined within national borders. But the new
services of the Electronic Silk Road often depend on processing information
about the user, information that crosses borders from the user’s country to the
service provider’s country. Data localization would thus require the
information service provider to build out a physical, local infrastructure in
every jurisdiction in which it operates, increasing costs and other burdens
enormously for both providers and consumers and rendering many of such
global services impossible.
While others have observed some of the hazards of data localization,
especially for American companies,7 this Article offers three major advances
over earlier work in the area. First, while the earlier analyses have referred to a
data localization measure in a country in the most general of terms, our Article
provides a detailed legal description of localization measures. Second, by
examining a variety of key countries around the world, the study allows us to
see the forms in which data localization is emerging and the justifications
offered for such measures in both liberal and illiberal states. Third, the Article
works to comprehensively refute the various arguments for data localization
offered around the world, showing that data localization measures are in fact
likely to undermine security, privacy, economic development, and innovation
where adopted.
6

See ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD 2–3 (2013).
See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH SMART GLOBAL
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY: THE GROWING THREAT OF LOCAL DATA SERVER REQUIREMENTS (2012),
available at http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/legacy/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/Global_
IT_Policy_Paper_final.pdf; DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM
COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? (2013), available at http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloudcomputing-costs.pdf; STEPHEN J. EZELL, ROBERT D. ATKINSON & MICHELLE A. WEIN, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., LOCALIZATION BARRIERS TO TRADE: THREAT TO THE GLOBAL INNOVATION ECONOMY
(2013), available at http://www2.itif.org/2013-localization-barriers-to-trade.pdf; EDWARD GRESSER,
PROGRESSIVE ECON., 21ST-CENTURY TRADE POLICY: THE INTERNET AND THE NEXT GENERATION’S GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2014), available at http://progressive-economy.org/files/2014/01/21st.Century.Trade_.pdf; U.S.
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. 4415, DIGITAL TRADE IN THE U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES, PART 1 (2013),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf.
7
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Our paper proceeds as follows. Part I describes the particular data
localization measures in place or proposed in different countries around the
world, as well as in the European Union. Part II then discusses the
justifications commonly offered for these measures—such as avoiding foreign
surveillance, enhancing security and privacy, promoting economic
development, and facilitating domestic law enforcement. We appraise these
arguments, concluding that, in fact, such measures are likely to backfire on all
fronts. Data localization will erode privacy and security without rendering
information free of foreign surveillance, while at the same time increasing the
risks of domestic surveillance.
I. COUNTRY STUDIES
We review here data localization measures in seventeen states—Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Vietnam—as well as the European Union and a handful of other countries in
less detail. The problem of data localization is even more pervasive than the
jurisdictions we identify. Furthermore, the measures achieve data localization
in a wide variety of ways. While some of the measures explicitly force data to
be located on home country servers, often the localizing effect is less visible
and more indirect. Kazakhstan’s directive, for example, is explicit, requiring
new companies using the “.kz” top level domain to operate from physical
servers located within the country.8 Malaysia, on the other hand, requires
consent for international transfer of data, which can prove a significant hurdle.9
Taiwan permits authorities to restrict transfers if they concern “major national
interests.”10 Other regulations focus on selected sectors. Australia prevents
health records from being transferred outside the country if they are personally
identifiable.11 In sum, our study reveals the astonishing array of countries that
have enacted or are considering data localization.

8 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2013: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL
MEDIA 441 (Sanja Kelly et al. eds., 2013), available at http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/
FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf.
9 Personal Data Protection Act 2010 § 129 (Act No. 709) (Malay.), available at http://www.kkmm.gov.
my/pdf/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202010.pdf.
10 Personal Information Protection Act (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, May 26, 2010), art. 21
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0050021.
11 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 77 (Austl.).
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A. Australia
In 2012, Australia passed the Personally Controlled Electronic Health
Records (PCEHR) Act, Section 77 of which prohibits the transfer of health
records outside of Australia, with certain exceptions.12 Subsection 1 provides:
The System Operator, a registered repository operator, a
registered portal operator or a registered contracted service provider
that holds records for the purposes of the PCEHR system (whether or
not the records are also held for other purposes) or has access to
information relating to such records, must not: (a) hold the records, or
take the records, outside Australia; or (b) process or handle the
information relating to the records outside Australia; or (c) cause or
permit another person: (i) to hold the records, or take the records,
outside Australia; or (ii) to process or handle the information relating
to the records outside Australia.13

Subsection 2 permits the transfer, processing, or handling of data outside of
Australia if such records do not include “personal information in relation to a
consumer” or “identifying information of an individual or entity.”14
In essence, under these provisions, foreign companies handling
health-related information must build data centers or outsource to local
services inside Australia. It also raises practical issues for users who wish to
access their data from overseas.15
B. Brazil
In 2011, Brazil’s Congress began considering the Marco Civil da Internet,
a landmark bill that would guarantee Brazilians a significant array of civil

12

Id.
Id. s 77(1).
14 Id. s 77(2).
15 An Australian local healthcare provider worried that the law would be difficult to operationalize in a
world where Australians carried mobile devices as they traveled overseas. CSC, CSC’S SUBMISSION TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS: INQUIRY INTO THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERSONALLY
CONTROLLED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS BILL 2011 AND A RELATED BILL 7 (2011), available at https://
senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=f9019a89-8166-42a4-b733-3b7d87f4afc3.
The provider observed, “Consumers will access their data via mobile devices overseas and this will result in
data, de facto, being accessed and potentially held or cached, outside of Australia.” Id.; see also Josh Taylor,
E-health Law to Block Overseas Access: CSC, ZDNET (Jan. 9, 2012, 06:04 GMT), http://www.
zdnet.com/e-health-law-to-block-overseas-access-csc-1339329216/ (examining CSC’s submission to
parliament).
13
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rights online.16 Some in the Internet community described it as an
“anti-ACTA,” referring to the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
that would have enhanced government and private powers on behalf of
intellectual property holders.17 Others described the bill as a “ground-breaking
internet bill of rights.”18
After the NSA surveillance revealed that the U.S. had surveilled both
President Dilma Rousseff and Brazil’s largest company, Petrobras,19 a new
version of the bill was introduced by House of Representatives Framework
Rapporteur Alessandro Molon (Workers Party Member from Rio de Janeiro) at
the request of President Rousseff.20 This version included a new power for the
executive branch: the ability to require that data about Brazilians be stored in
Brazil.21 Article 12 of the new proposed Marco Civil provided as follows:
The Executive branch, through Decree, may force connection
providers and Internet applications providers provided for in art. 11,
who exercise their activities in an organized, professional and
economic way, to install or use structures for storage, management
16 See Letter from Dean C. Garfield, President & CEO, Info. Tech. Indus. Council, to the Honorable
Gleisi Helena Hoffmann, Minister, Casa Civil, Presidency of the Republic (Aug. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/2a6d7008-9c61-4f7c-917a-5fe4ad493527.pdf. The Marco Civil was inspired by
the work of Ronaldo Lemos. See Ronaldo Lemos, Internet brasileira precisa de marco regulatório civil
[Brazilian Internet Needs Civil Regulatory Framework], UOL (May 22, 2007, 21h13), http://tecnologia.uol.
com.br/ultnot/2007/05/22/ult4213u98.jhtm (Braz.).
17 See Glyn Moody, Brazil Drafts an ‘Anti-ACTA’: A Civil Rights-Based Framework for the Internet,
TECHDIRT (Oct. 4, 2011, 1:12 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111004/04402516196/brazil-draftsanti-acta-civil-rights-based-framework-internet.shtml.
18 Everything is Connected, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2013, at 17, available at http://www.economist.com/
news/briefing/21569041-can-internet-activism-turn-real-political-movement-everything-connected.
19 See Glenn Greenwald, Robert Kaz & José Casado, EUA Espionaram Milhões de E-mails e Ligações
de Brasileiros [US Spied on Millions of Emails and Calls from Brazil], O GLOBO MUNDO (Dec. 7, 2013,
19:50), http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/eua-espionaram-milhoes-de-mails-ligacoes-de-brasileiros-8940934#ix
zz2lEHZqYwh (Braz.); Angelica Mari, Brazilian Government Tries to Deal with NSA Spying, ZDNET (July 8,
2013, 17:06 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/brazilian-government-tries-to-deal-with-nsa-spying-7000017771/;
Jonathan Watts, NSA Accused of Spying on Brazilian Oil Company Petrobras, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2013,
11:55 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/nsa-spying-brazil-oil-petrobras; Brian Winter,
Exclusive: Brazil’s Rousseff Wants U.S. Apology for NSA Spying, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/04/us-usa-security-snowden-brazil-idUSBRE98314N20130904.
20 Brazilian President Pursues Server Localization Policies, WHITE & CASE LLP (Jan. 2014),
http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-01082014-2/#.VFU9lPTF9pY; see also Dilma Rousseff, President of the
Federative Republic of Brazil, Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 68th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/
files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf [hereinafter Statement by Dilma Rousseff].
21 Substitutivo ao Projeto de Lei n. 2126 de 2011 [Substitutive Bill Proposal to Draft Law No. 2126 of
2011], translation available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MC_Eng_CR_
Nov_13_2013.docx (Carolina Rossini, trans.).
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and dissemination of data in the country, considering the size of the
providers, its sales in Brazil and breadth of the service offering to the
Brazilian public.22

Internet companies found in violation could face a “fine of up to ten percent of
the [previous year’s] gross revenues” from their activities in Brazil.23 After
consideration, however, the Marco Civil was passed into law on April 23,
2014, without the much-debated data localization provision.24
C. Canada
While Canada’s national law, the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),25 does not prohibit the transfer of
personal data outside of Canada, cross-border data flow faces provincial
prohibitions. These provincial restraints developed out of attempts to outsource
government information technology services to providers based in the United
States.26 While these rules were formulated long before the Snowden
revelations, they were justified by increases in the U.S. government’s
surveillance power provided in the USA PATRIOT Act.27
Two Canadian provinces, British Columbia and Nova Scotia, have enacted
laws requiring that personal information held by public institutions—schools,
universities, hospitals, government-owned utilities, and public agencies—be
stored and accessed only in Canada unless one of a few limited exceptions
applies.28
British Columbia’s 1996 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act states, “A public body must ensure that personal information in its custody

22

Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 13.
24 See Philippe Bradley & Dan Cooper, Brazil Enacts “Marco Civil” Internet Civil Rights Bill,
INSIDEPRIVACY (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.insideprivacy.com/international/brazil-enacts-marco-civilinternet-civil-rights-bill/ (blog maintained by Covington & Burling discussing the Marco Civil law).
25 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (Can.).
26 See FRED H. CATE, CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, PROVINCIAL CANADIAN GEOGRAPHIC
RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONAL DATA IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.hunton.com/
files/Publication/2a6f5831-07b6-4300-af8d-ae30386993c1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0480e5b99309-4049-9f25-4742cc9f6dce/cate_patriotact_white_paper.pdf.
27 See id.
28 See Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 30.1 (Can.),
available at http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/96165_00; Personal Information International
Disclosure Protection Act, S.N.S. 2006, c. 3, s. 5(1) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ns/laws/stat/
sns-2006-c-3/latest/sns-2006-c-3.html.
23

CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2

686

2/19/2015 12:30 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:677

or under its control is stored only in Canada and accessed only in Canada.”29
Exceptions to this requirement include situations in which the data subject “has
identified the information and has consented . . . to it being stored in or
accessed from . . . another jurisdiction.”30 Nova Scotia provides a similar
localization mandate,31 but its law also permits storage or access outside of
Canada if the “head of a public body” determines that it is necessary for the
public body’s operation.32
Consider the implications of British Columbia’s rule for the use of a
foreign email service. If an individual uses Google’s Gmail (presumably based
in the United States), not only would she have to consent to the transfer of
information to the United States, but every Canadian she talks about in her
Gmail email messages would have to consent as well.33
D. China
Localization obligations exist in certain Chinese sector-specific operations.
In 2011, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) issued a Notice to Urge Banking
Financial Institutions to Protect Personal Financial Information.34 Chinese
banks and foreign invested commercial banking institutions “are required to
observe [this Notice] when collecting, processing and storing personal
financial information (PFI).”35 The Notice “prohibits Banks from storing,
processing or analysing outside China any PFI which has been collected in
China, or providing PFI collected in China to an offshore entity.”36 Banks
outsourcing their data outside of China need to pay special attention to this
requirement, especially as the Notice defines PFI very broadly, including

29

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, at c. 165, s. 30.1.
Id. s. 30.1(a).
31 Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act, S.N.S. 2006, at c. 3, s. 5(1)(a)–(b).
32 Id. s. 5(2).
33 See CHANDER, supra note 6, at 6.
34 Zhongguorenmin Yinhang Guanyu Yinhangye Jinrong Jigou Zuo Hao Geren Jinrong Xinxi Baohu
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (中国人民银行关于银行业金融机构做好个人金融信息保护工作的通知) [Notice on
Urging Banking Financial Institutions to Do a Good Job in Protecting Personal Financial Information]
(promulgated by the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 21, 2011) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8837&CGid=; Gigi Cheah, Protection of Personal Financial
Information in China, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
knowledge/publications/56148/protection-of-personal-financial-information-in-china.
35 See Cheah, supra note 34.
36 See id.
30
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personal information of identity, property, account, credit, financial
transaction, etc.37
In 2013, the Chinese government issued the Information Security
Technology Guidelines for Personal Information Protection within Public and
Commercial Services Information Systems (the Guidelines).38 Although the
Guidelines are a voluntary technical guidance document,39 they might serve as
a regulatory baseline for Chinese judicial authorities and lawmakers.40 The
Guidelines prohibit the transfer of personal data abroad without express
consent of the data subject or explicit regulatory approval. Article 5.4.5 of the
Guidelines provides as follows:
37 See id. The United States Federal Reserve has simply asked banks to examine the risks associated with
outsourcing, whether within the United States or offshore. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
GUIDANCE ON MANAGING OUTSOURCING RISK (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/srletters/sr1319a1.pdf.
38 On July 16, 2013, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) promulgated the
Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of Telecommunication and Internet Users (the Provisions),
which went into effect on September 1, 2013. Dianxin He Hulianwangyonghu Geren Xinxi Baohu Guiding (电
信和互联网用户个人信息保护规定) [Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of
Telecommunications and Internet Users] (promulgated by the Ministry of Indus. & Info. Tech. July 16, 2013,
effective, Sept. 1, 2013) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display
.aspx?id=14971&lib=law&SearchKeyword=personal%20information&SearchCKeyword=. The Provisions
provide implementing rules for the Decision on Strengthening Protection of Online Information (the Decision),
a national law issued in December 2012. See China Dives into Data Protection Regulation, TAYLORWESSING
(Apr. 2013), http://www.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article_china_dp.html (“The [National People’s
Congress] rolled out its Decision on Strengthening Internet Information Protection (Decision) on 28 December
2012.”); see also MIIT Issues Comprehensive Regulation on Collection and Use of Personal Information by
Internet and Telecommunication Service Providers, LEHMAN, LEE & XU, http://www.lehmanlaw.com/
resource-centre/faqs/information-technology/miit-issues-comprehensive-regulation-on-collection-and-use-ofpersonal-information-by-internet-and-telecommunication-service-providers.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
These provisions are in addition to the Information Security Technology Guidelines for Personal Information
Protection within Public and Commercial Services Information Systems, promulgated on January 21, 2013,
which became effective February 1, 2013. A translation of these Guidelines composed by Dr. George Yijun
Tian, in addition to an overview of them, can be found in Graham Greenleaf & George Yijun Tian, China
Expands Data Protection through 2013 Guidelines, PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP., Apr. 2013, at 1 (2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2280037 [hereinafter Guidelines].
39 Daniel Cooper, Eric Carlson & Scott Livingston, China Releases New National Standard for Personal
Information Collected over Information Systems, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.
cov.com/files/Publication/a180859b-c1ab-4ecf-a274-e6d1a7b5fb2e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c8
aad899-85f3-4d26-bb06-f0518ee09e20/China_Releases%20_New_National_Standard_for_Personal_
Information_Collected_Over_Information_Systems.pdf.
40 Gao Chiyang, Deputy Director of China Software Testing Center, who drafted the Guidelines, noted
that even though the Guidelines are voluntary, they can provide principles for upcoming legislations. See Zhao
Zie (赵杰), Geren Xinxi Baohu Lifa Shang wu Shijianbiao Qiye Cheng Xiemi Zhu Qyudao (个人信息保护立
法尚无时间表 企业成泄密主渠道) [Personal Information Protection Legislation: There is No Timetable in
the Main Channel of Business], CHINA SEC. J. (Apr. 20, 2012, 13:57), http://www.cs.com.cn/
xwzx/sz/201204/t20120420_3325052.html.
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Absent express consent of the subject of the personal information, or
explicit legal or regulatory permission, or absent the consent of the
competent authorities, the administrator of personal information must
not transfer the personal information to any overseas receiver of
personal information, including any individuals located overseas or
any organizations and institutions registered overseas.41

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets
prevents data from being removed from China if it is deemed to contain a state
secret.42 “State secrets” are “matters that have a vital bearing on state security
and national interests,”43 and include “secrets in national economic and social
development,” “secrets concerning science and technology,” and even
“[s]ecrets of political parties.”44
E. European Union
The European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive recognized that the
free flow of data across borders was necessary to commerce.45 At the same
time, it sought to ensure that data about Europeans was well protected as it
traveled the world.46 Accordingly, it allowed data to be sent outside the
European Union (or the European Free Trade Association states) if it were
protected adequately either by local law or by contractual arrangement with the
foreign company.47 To date, the European Commission has found eleven
41

Guidelines, supra note 38, at art 5.4.5.
See Tom Antisdel & Tarek Ghalayini, The Challenge of Conducting Data Collections and
Investigations Under Unclear Data Privacy Rules, CHINA BUS. REV., Oct.–Dec. 2011, at 46, 48, available at
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/the-challenge-of-conducting-data-collections-and-investigations-underunclear-data-privacy-rules/.
43 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法) [Law of
the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989), art. 2 (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1191&CGid=.
44 Id. art. 8.
45 See Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 36–37 [hereinafter Council Directive] (“Whereas cross-border flows of personal
data are necessary to the expansion of international trade . . . .”).
46 See id. at 31 (showing that the establishment and functioning of an internal market in which, in
accordance with Article 7a of the Treaty, the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured
requires not only that personal data should be able to flow freely from one Member State to another but also
that the fundamental rights of individuals should be safeguarded).
47 See id. at 37, 45–46. The Data Protection Directive typically limits the transfer of data outside the
European Union or the European Free Trade Association unless the country to which it is exported has been
adjudged by the European Commission as providing “an adequate level of protection” for data or where the
foreign processor agrees to contractual protections for the data. See id.
42
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jurisdictions as having adequate protection: Andorra, Argentina, Canada,
Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, the Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and Uruguay.48 Given the amount of information exchanged with
the United States, the European Union negotiated a special Safe Harbor with
the United States, allowing data to be exported to companies in the United
States that abide by certain data protection standards, under the supervision of
the Federal Trade Commission.49 Recently, however, the European Union has
been reconsidering the Safe Harbor, alongside a major effort to rewrite
European Union privacy law altogether.50 The EU parliamentarian in charge of
steering the European Commission’s proposed data protection reform,
Jan-Philipp Albrecht, released a report in 2013 recommending that the EU
discontinue the Safe Harbor framework after enacting major privacy reforms.51
After the NSA revelations broke, Vice President Viviane Reding declared that
the Safe Harbor agreement “may not be so safe after all.”52 The European
Parliament also requested the European Commission to review the Safe
Harbor.53 On November 27, 2013, the Commission published a set of
recommendations that it asked the United States Department of Commerce to
consider, with the possibility left open that the Safe Harbor might be
suspended.54
48 See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries,
EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/adequacy/
index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2015).
49 For the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles themselves, see Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and
Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45666 (Dep’t of Commerce July 24, 2000) (notice).
50 Stephen Gardner, Lead EU Lawmaker Report Seeks Changes to Proposed Data Protection Regulation,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.bna.com/lead-eu-lawmaker-n17179871844/.
51 See Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 198, COM (2012) 11 (Nov. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0402+0+DOC+
XML+V0//EN&language=en.
52 See Christopher Wolf, EU VP Reding Uses PRISM as Lever to Push Enactment of Regulation and
Questions EU-US Safe Harbor, CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (July 19, 2013), http://www.hldataprotection.com/
2013/07/articles/international-eu-privacy/eu-vp-reding-uses-prism-as-lever-to-push-enactment-of-regulationand-questions-eu-us-safe-harbor/.
53 See Resolution on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in
Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy, EUR. PARL. DOC. RSP 2682 (2013),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7-RC-2013-0336&
language=EN.
54 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Rebuilding
Trust in EU-US Data Flows, COM (2013) 846 final (Nov. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Rebuilding Trust in EU-US
Data Flows], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_846_en.pdf; Stephen
Gardner, U.S. Officials Respond to EU Concerns Over Safe Harbor Data Transfer Program, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.bna.com/us-officials-respond-n17179880742/.
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In October 2013, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and
Home Affairs Committee voted to advance a sweeping reform of EU data
protection law titled the General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR).55
The GDPR allows companies to transfer data outside the European Union if
appropriate safeguards are in place, such as binding corporate rules, a valid
“European Data Protection Seal” for both controller and recipient, standard
data protection clauses, or contractual clauses with prior authorization from the
member state’s data protection authority.56 The draft would prohibit the
transfer to a country where the law permits local authorities access to personal
data from the European Union.57 Currently, the draft is undergoing
Parliament–Council negotiations, which were projected to conclude at the end
of 2014.58
F. France
Citing both concerns about foreign surveillance and competitiveness, the
French government has sought over the last few years to promote a local data
center infrastructure, which some have dubbed “le cloud souverain,” or the
sovereign cloud.59 The government has directly invested in two cloud
computing enterprises, Numergy and Cloudwatt, with a one-third ownership
stake in each.60 In February 2013, Minister of Industry Arnaud Montebourg
declared his support for efforts to keep data processing in France in order to
support domestic employment.61 Whether a subsidy to domestic enterprises is a
55 Press Release, Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, Eur. Parliament, Civil Liberties
MEPs Pave the Way for Stronger Data Protection in the EU (Oct. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20131021IPR22706/20131021IPR22706_en.pdf.
56 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individual with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General
Data Protection Regulation), Compromise Amendments on Articles 30–91, at art. 42(1)–(4), COM (2012) 11
(Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_
am_art_30-91/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf.
57 Id. art. 41, recital 82.
58 Q&A on EU Data Protection Reform, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Apr. 3, 2014, 09:04), http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/background/20130502BKG07917/20130502BKG07917_en.pdf.
59 See Jérôme Colombain, La France Veut Son “Cloud Souverain” [France Wants His “Sovereign
Cloud”], FRANCE INFO (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.franceinfo.fr/high-tech/nouveau-monde/la-france-veutson-cloud-souverain-586813-2012-04-16.
60 See David Meyer, A Guide to the French National Cloud(s), GIGAOM (Nov. 18, 2013, 7:55 AM PST),
http://gigaom.com/2013/11/18/a-guide-to-the-french-national-clouds/.
61 Arnaud Montebourg: «Google et Facebook agissent ainsi car il n’y a pas de règles» [Arnaud
Montebourg: Google and Facebook are Doing this Because There are No Rules], 20 MINUTES.FR (Feb. 28,
2013 09:29), http://www.20minutes.fr/politique/1109303-arnaud-montebourg-nous-faisons-tous-jours-loiscitoyens-pourquoi-contre-geants-linternet.
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violation of trade commitments is a complicated question. The Snowden
revelations spurred an additional push by the government to localize data in
France: if the PRISM claim “turns out to be true, it makes [it] relatively
relevant to locate datacentres and servers in [French] national territory in order
to better ensure data security,” the Digital Economy Minister Fleur Pellerin
explained.62 The government’s ambition to promote a “Made in France” label
includes efforts in cloud computing, big data, and connected devices.63 In its
national innovation plan, the government declared its goal to “build a France of
digital sovereignty.”64
Proposals to tax the “collection, management and commercial exploitation
of personal data generated by users located in France” may well be
implemented in a form designed to discourage services located outside the
country.65 Proponents of the tax, in fact, reveal that one goal of the tax is to
“[p]romot[e] productivity gains and value creation in the domestic
economy.”66 The so-called “data tax” would apply to “data derived from the
regular and systematic monitoring of users’ activity.”67 Under the proposal, the
tax rate would depend on the level of compliance with respect to privacy,
potentially diminishing to zero for those that were fully compliant.68 If France
were to declare that data processing in the United States was noncompliant,
even when conducted under the Safe Harbor, such a tax would effectively

62

See Valéry Marchive, France Hopes to Turn PRISM Worries into Cloud Opportunities, ZDNET (June
21, 2013, 9:02 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/france-hopes-to-turn-prism-worries-into-cloud-opportunities7000017089/ (second alteration in original).
63 See MINISTÈRE DU REDRESSEMENT PRODUCTIF [MINISTRY OF ECON. REGENERATION], THE NEW FACE
OF INDUSTRY IN FRANCE 51, 53, 61 (2013), available at http://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/files/files/
directions_services/secteurs-professionnels/industrie/nfi/NFI-anglais.pdf [hereinafter NEW FACE OF
INDUSTRY]. President François Hollande announced a national innovation program on September 12, 2013.
Nicholas Vinocur, Hollande Turns to Robots, Driverless Cars to Revive French Industry, REUTERS, Sept. 12,
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-france-industry-idUSBRE98B0HW201309
12.
64 NEW FACE OF INDUSTRY, supra note 63, at 51.
65 PIERRE COLLIN & NICHOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL ECON., REPORT TO
THE MINISTER FOR THE ECONOMY AND FINANCE, THE MINISTER FOR INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY, THE MINISTER
DELEGATE FOR THE BUDGET AND THE MINISTER DELEGATE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES,
INNOVATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 122 (2013), available at http://www.21stcenturytaxation.com/
uploads/Taxation_Digital_Economy_Jan2013_France.pdf.
66 Id. (emphasis omitted).
67 Id. at 123.
68 Id. (“The tax could take the form of a unit charge per user monitored. . . . The more ‘compliant’ the
company’s practices are regarding the collection, management and use of data derived from users’ activity, the
lower the unit charge would be. The charge could even be waived for the most compliant companies.”
(footnote omitted)).
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become a tax on the export of data.69 One report notes the possibility of “a
global trade war taking place under the guise of taxation.”70
Shortly after President François Hollande expressed outrage over U.S.
spying, France adopted the Military Programming Law on December 10, 2013,
dubbed by some “the French Patriot Act,”71 permitting both the security forces
and intelligence services from various ministries (defense, interior, economy,
and budget)72 to see “electronic and digital communications” in “real time.”73
G. Germany
On July 24, 2013, in the wake of the NSA revelations, the Conference of
the German Data Protection Commissioners announced that they would stop
approving international data transfers until the German government could
guarantee that foreign national intelligence services abide by fundamental
principles of data protection law.74 They relied on their authority from the
69

The report accompanying the proposal suggests that compliance might mean going beyond complying
with the letter of the law. Id. at 123–24 (“It is not yet time to determine which practices could be qualified as
‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant.’ . . . The point is to assess whether, in addition to meeting its legal obligations,
which it must do in any case, the company’s approach goes above and beyond compliance with the letter of the
law.” (emphasis omitted)).
70 Ian Allison, Europe Cracks Down on Google, Apple, Facebook and the Data-Driven Tax Black Hole,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013, 09:18 GMT), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/tax-internet-ec-oecd-googlefacebook-apple-529601 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bruno Waterfield, UK Braced for Battle
with France over Google Data Tax, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:42 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/10399840/UK-braced-for-battle-with-France-overGoogle-data-tax.html.
71 James Creedon, Privacy Concerns After Passing of “French Patriot Act,” FRANCE24 (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.france24.com/en/20131212-french-patriot-act-military-programming-law-carla-bruni-nude-photoshacking/.
72 Loi 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à
2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale [Law No. 2013-1168 of
December 18, 2013 on the Military Budget for the Years 2014–2019 and Miscellaneous Provisions for
Defense and National Security], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Dec. 19, 2013, p. 20570 (Fr.); Kim Willsher, French Officials Can Monitor Internet Users in
Real Time Under New Law, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2013, 13:18 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/dec/11/french-officials-internet-users-real-time-law.
73 Willsher, supra note 72. The legislation has drawn criticism. Andréa Fradin, L’article 13 Est-il Plus
Dangereux pour Internet que les Lois Existantes? [Section 13: Is It More Dangerous for the Internet than
Existing Laws?], SLATE.FR (Dec. 17, 2013, 14h35), http://www.slate.fr/story/81011/loi-programmationmilitaire-danger (Fr.) (critiquing the Association of Internet Community Services, Syntec, French Federation
of Telecoms, MEDEF, International Federation of Human Rights, La Quadrature du Net, CNIL and the
CNNum); Alarm Over Massive Spying Provisions in New Military Programming Law, REPORTERS WITHOUT
BORDERS (Dec. 12, 2013), http://en.rsf.org/alarm-over-massive-spying-12-12-2013,45606.html.
74 Press Release, Die Landesbeauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit [State Commissioner
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information], Conference of Data Protection Commissioners Says that
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Commission of the European Communities to suspend data transfers if either
the Safe Harbor or the standard contractual clauses permitting data transfer
have a “substantial likelihood” of violation.75 The Commissioners argued that
the violations arose because data transferred by German companies can be
accessed by the NSA and various other foreign intelligence services without
complying with limitation principles (viz., need, proportionality, and
purpose).76
While the Commissioners sought to stop data flow outside Europe, some
within Germany proposed to limit data flow only to routes within Germany. In
October 2013, Deutsche Telekom (which is one-third state-owned)77 proposed
that data between Germans be routed inside German networks.78 The idea was
Intelligence Services Constitute a Mass Threat to Data Traffic Between Germany and Countries Outside
Europe
(July
24,
2013),
available
at
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/
Entschliessungssammlung/ErgaenzendeDokumente/PMDSK_SafeHarbor_Eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
75 Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of
Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5, 8 [hereinafter Commission Decision on Standard
Contractual Clauses], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:039:
0005:0018:EN:PDF; see also Commission Decision of 27 December 2004 Amending Decision 2001/497/EC
as Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal
Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74, 74–75, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:385:0074:0084:en:PDF.
76 German privacy regulators have taken issue with the Safe Harbor with the United States in the past. In
2010, German regulators, through an information organization known as the Düsseldorfer Kreises [Düsseldorf
Circle], maintained that U.S. Safe Harbor self-certifications should not be automatically be considered as
conclusive proof of adequate protection. See BESCHLUSS DER OBERSTEN AUFSICHTSBEHÖR DEN FÜR DEN
DATENSCHUTZ IM NICHT-ÖFFENTLICHEN BEREICH AM 28./29. APRIL 2010 IN HANNOVER, PRÜFUNG DER
SELBST-ZERTIFIZIERUNG DES DATENIMPORTEURS NACH DEM SAFE HARBOR-ABKOMMEN DURCH DAS DATEN
EXPORTIERENDE UNTERNEHMEN [DECISION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTION IN
NON-PUBLIC AREAS ON 28/29TH APRIL 2010 IN HANNOVER, CONSIDERATION OF SELF-CERTIFICATION OF
DATA IMPORTER TO THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT BY THE DATA EXPORTING COMPANY] (Apr. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlung/Duesseldorfer
Kreis/290410_SafeHarbor.pdf;jsessionid=34480CBEFF09F90E0916CE90C8B0E224.1_cid354?__blob=publi
cationFile; U.S.–EU Safe Harbor, ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP., June 23, 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2010/06/German%20Authorities%20Issue%20Privacy%2
0Decision%20Clarif__/Files/German%20Authorities%20Issue%20Privacy%20Decision%20Clarif__/FileAtta
chment/German%20Authorities%20Issue%20Privacy%20Decision%20Clarif__.pdf;
German
Privacy
Regulators Issue Decision on Data Protection and Safe-harbor Self-Certification of US Companies, DUANE
MORRIS (June 1, 2010), http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/Dusseldorfer_Kreis_Safe_Harbor_Privacy_
3680.html. For a defense of the Safe Harbor, see Damon Greer, Safe Harbor—A Framework that Works, 1
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 143, 146 (2011).
77 Cornelius Rahn & Tino Andresen, Germany Should Sell 32% Deutsche Telekom Stake, Adviser Says,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:05 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-16/germany-shouldsell-phone-stake-to-fund-networks-adviser-says.html.
78 Telecoms
Plan Shielded European Internet, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://www.dw.de/telecoms-plan-shielded-european-internet/a-17217304.
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also supported by then-Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich.79 Earlier in
August, Deutsche Telekom launched “E-mail made in Germany,” a service
that seeks to route data exclusively through domestic servers.80 In February
2014, Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed that Europe build out its own
internet infrastructure designed to keep data within Europe.81 She believed that
“European providers [could] offer security for our citizens, so that one
shouldn’t have to send emails and other information across the Atlantic.”82
Some questioned whether the proposals, which would increase both network
construction and operation costs significantly, would in fact protect data from
foreign surveillance (an issue we return to in Part II.A below) or simply
increase the profits of local network firms.83
H. India
In April 2011, the Indian Ministry of Communications and Technology
published privacy rules implementing certain provisions of the Information
Technology Act of 2000.84 The “Information Technology (Reasonable Security
Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules”
limit the transfer of “sensitive personal data or information” abroad to two
cases—when “necessary” or when the data subject consents to the transfer
abroad.85 Specifically, Rule 7 provides as follows:
79 See German Minister: Drop US Sites If You Fear Spying, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 3, 2013, available
at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/german-minister-drop-google-if-you-fear-us-spying (“Whoever fears their
communication is being intercepted in any way should use services that don’t go through American
servers . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80 Will It Work? German Email Companies Adopt New Encryption to Foil NSA, RT.COM (Aug. 11, 2013,
10:54), http://rt.com/news/german-email-encryption-nsa-312/.
81 Merkel and Hollande Mull Secure European Communication Web, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb 16, 2014),
http://www.dw.de/merkel-and-hollande-mull-secure-european-communication-web/a-17435895.
82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83 Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe’s Internet Data, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengen-zone-for-europes-internet-data/a-17443482.
84 The Information Technology Act 2000 focused on computer misuse but did not cover data security.
Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India). The IT (Amendment) Act 2008
added two additional sections, Section 43A and Section 72A, to address the loss and protection of personal
data. Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 2009 (India).
85 Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data
or Information) Rules, 2011, Gazette of India, subsection II(3)(i) (Apr. 11, 2011). The rules define the type of
information that the Act covers:

Sensitive personal data or information of a person means such personal information which
consists of information relating to[:]—(i) password; (ii) financial information such as Bank
account or credit card or debit card or other payment instrument details; (iii) physical,
physiological and mental health condition; (iv) sexual orientation; (v) medical records and
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A body corporate or any person on its behalf may transfer sensitive
personal data or information including any information, to any other
body corporate or a person in India, or located in any other country,
that ensures the same level of data protection that is adhered to by the
body corporate as provided for under these Rules. The transfer may
be allowed only if it is necessary for the performance of the lawful
contract between the body corporate or any person on its behalf and
provider of information or where such person has consented to data
transfer.86

Because it is difficult to establish that a transfer data abroad is “necessary,”
this provision would effectively ban transfers abroad except when an
individual consents.
The Rules, however, do not make it clear how consent for onward transfer
from the information collector to the information processor is to be obtained.
When it comes to collecting the personal information in the first instance, the
rules require consent provided in writing, via fax, or through email—which
(depending on how “writing” is interpreted) could foreclose even the typical
webpage with an “I agree” button.87 Commentators observed that the consent
requirements were “far more restrictive” than what is required under United
States or European Union laws.88 European Union laws require consent for
data collection and processing generally, not special consent for transfer
abroad.89 Special consent required for exporting data suggests that data sent to
another country is, by that act, less safe—thus requiring special knowledge and
approval of the data subject. Because consent for offshore transfer can be a
significant practical hurdle, American critics of outsourcing to India have
sought to impose a consent requirement before consumer information can be

history; (vi) [b]iometric information; (vii) any detail relating to the above clauses as provided to
body corporate for providing service; and (viii) any of the information received under above
clauses by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or
otherwise[;] provided that, any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain
or finished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force
shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data or information for the purposes of these rules.
Id. at Rule 3.
86 Id. at Rule 7.
87 MIRIAM H. WUGMEISTER & CYNTHIA J. RICH, MORRISON & FOERSTER, INDIA’S NEW PRIVACY
REGULATIONS 3 (2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110504-Indias-NewPrivacy-Regulations.pdf.
88 Id. at 1.
89 Council Directive, supra note 45, at 40.
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sent outside the United States.90 As drafted, the Indian law seemed to ironically
accomplish the goal of those against outsourcing to India—that is, requiring
American companies to obtain the consent of individuals before passing their
information to India.91 In August 2011, the Ministry of Communications &
Information Technology clarified that the Rules were meant only to apply to
companies gathering data of Indians, and only where the companies were
located in India.92 While patching over one problem, the clarification may
discourage foreign companies from investing in India because to do so would
bring them under the purview of the Rules. (We return to the impact of data
localization on local economic development in Part II.C below.)
Another statute potentially poses substantial localization pressures for
information held by the government. Section 4 of the Public Records Act of
1993 prohibits public records from being transferred out of India territory,
except for “public purpose[s].”93 It provides that “[n]o person shall take or
cause to be taken out of India any public records without the prior approval of
the Central Government; [p]rovided that no such prior approval shall be
required if any public records are taken or sent out of India for any official
purpose.”94
Under the statute, “any . . . material produced by a computer” constitutes
“public records.”95 In 2013, the Delhi High Court interpreted this requirement
to bar the transfer of government emails outside India.96 It ordered the
90 A bill proposed in New York explicitly designed to “stem the flow of skilled and unskilled labor out of
New York State” requires that no business transfer “personal information to or with any nonaffiliated third
parties which are located outside the United States . . . without . . . prior written consent.” New York
Consumer and Worker Protection Act, S. 2992, 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
91 James A Harvey & Todd S. McClelland, Outsourcing and Privacy & Security Advisory—Questions
Answered, More Questions Raised: Exploring the Outsourcing Implications of India’s Recently Released
Privacy Rules, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (June 21, 2011), http://www.alston.com/files/publication/34af0cc7-3ec94c05-b713-3692f2addf28/presentation/publicationattachment/9a608746-920d-4990-8b2b-57ef0e1a8b76/
outsourcing%20and%20privacy%20%26%20security%20advisory.pdf.
92 See Press Note, Press Info. Bureau, Gov’t of India, Clarification on Information Technology
(Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 Under
Section 43A of the Information Technology ACT, 2000, (Aug. 24, 2011), available at
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=74990; Deepa Christopher & Praveen Thomas, India – Welcome
Clarification on Sensitive Personal Data Rules, LINKLATERS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.linklaters.com/
Insights/Publication1403Newsletter/TMT-newsletter-September-2011/Pages/India-data-security-laws.aspx.
93 The Public Records Act, No. 69 of 1993, § 4, INDIA CODE (1993), available at
http://nationalarchives.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/html/public_records93.html.
94 Id.
95 Id. § 2(e)(iv).
96 See Delhi HC Asks Government to Formulate an Email Policy Within 4-weeks, IBN LIVE (Oct. 30,
2013, 3:06 PM IST), http://ibnlive.in.com/news/delhi-hc-asks-government-to-formulate-an-email-policy-
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government to formulate a policy for official government email that would
comply with the Public Records Act.97 A draft of the “E-mail Policy of the
Government of India” would mandate that government employees use only
government email services, thereby preventing the use of private services
based abroad or at home.98 The Information Technology Directorate of the
state of Maharashtra advised all government department’s websites “should be
hosted within India and preferably on government owned servers” and to use
“government provided email IDs, from servers within India . . . for official
communication by all government employees.”99
In February 2014, the National Security Council (NSC) proposed a policy
that might require data localization for Indian citizens, and not just government
agencies alone. According to an NSC internal note seen by the newspaper The
Hindu Business Line, “All email service providers may be mandated to host
servers for their India operations in India. All data generated from within India
should be hosted in these India-based servers and this would make them
subject to Indian laws[.]”100 The NSC proposal would prohibit “[a]s a general
principle, mirroring of data in these servers to main servers abroad.”101
Moreover, the National Security Advisor has called on the Department of
Telecom to mandate all telecom and Internet companies “to route local data
through the National Internet Exchange of India” to ensure that domestic
Internet packets remain mostly in India.102 The Standing Committee on
Information Technology of the Ministry of Information noted in February 2014
that it is “unhappy” that a “majority of the websites are still being hosted
outside India.”103
within-4weeks/431351-3-244.html; see also Delhi High Court Seeks Clear-cut Answers from Centre on Its
Email Policy, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 07:19 PM IST), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201410-01/news/54516892_1_email-policy-k-n-govindacharya-delhi-high-court.
97 Delhi HC Asks Government to Formulate an Email Policy within 4-weeks, supra note 96.
98 STANDING COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, CYBER CRIME, CYBER SECURITY AND RIGHT
TO PRIVACY 21 (2014), available at https://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/15_Information_Technology_
52.pdf.
99 Letter from Rajesh Aggarwal, Sec’y of Info. Tech., Directorate of Info. Tech., to all Gov. Depts. in
Maharashtra, India 2 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at https://www.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/upload/WhatsNew/
Advisory%20dated%20300913.pdf.
100 Thomas K. Thomas, National Security Council Proposes 3-Pronged Plan to Protect Internet Users,
HINDU BUS. LINE (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/smartbuy/national-securitycouncil-proposes-3pronged-plan-to-protect-internet-users/article5685794.ece (internal quotation marks
omitted).
101 Id.
102 Thomas, supra note 3.
103 STANDING COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 96, at 61.
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I. Indonesia
In 2012, the Indonesian government required service providers providing
“public services” to place their data centers within the country. Regulation 82
concerning “Electronic System and Transaction Operation” states, “Electronic
System Operator for the public service is obligated to put the data center and
disaster recovery center in Indonesian territory for the purpose of law
enforcement, protection, and enforcement of national sovereignty to the data of
its citizens.”104 Although the term “public services” is defined in the Public
Service Law of 2009,105 this provision did not define exactly what kinds of
“electronic system operators” were deemed to be in the “public service.”106 A
Draft Regulation Concerning Registration Procedure of Electronic System
Provider clarifies this somewhat, explaining that “public service electronic
systems by the private business sector” include any “[o]nline gate, site or
online application over the internet which provides an offer and/or trade of
goods and/or service; . . . enables payment facility and/or other financial
transaction over the data network; . . . [or] is used for paid digital content
delivery over the data network.”107
On its face, this approach seems so broad that almost all websites and
online applications such as newspapers or information and social platforms
104 Regulation Concerning Electronic System and Transaction Operation, Law No. 82 of 2012, art. 17(2)
(Government Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2012 No. 189) (Indon.), translation available at
TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR TRADE-RELATED ADMINISTRATION IN
INDONESIA, http://rulebook-jica.ekon.go.id/english/4902_PP_82_2012_e.html. The Regulation serves to clarify
the Law on Information and Electronic Transactions 2008.
105 Undang-Undang Tentang Pelayanan Publik [Public Service Law], Law No. 25/2009, July 18, 2009
(Government Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2009 No. 112) (Indon.), available at
http://www.setneg.go.id//components/com_perundangan/docviewer.php?id=2274&filename=UU%2025%20T
ahun%202009.pdf; see also Michael Buehler, Indonesia’s Law on Public Services: Changing State-Society
Relations or Continuing Politics as Usual?, 47 BULL. INDON. ECON. STUD. 65 (2011), available at
http://michaelbuehler.asia/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/BIESBuehler2011.pdf.
106 Law No. 25/2009, art. 5.7(b); Indonesia, Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, LINKLATERS,
https://clientsites.linklaters.com/Clients/dataprotected/Pages/Indonesia.aspx (last updated May 2014). Public
services are services (a) provided by government agencies, (b) provided by a business entity founding capital
partly or entirely derived from the wealth of the country, (c) provided by none of the above but whose delivery
is part of state’s mission. In the elucidation, it was further stated that the State’s missions are: health,
education, inter city transportation, aviation, social welfare homes, and security services. See Indonesia,
Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, supra.
107 Rancangan Peraturan Menteri (RPM) tentang Tata Cara Pendaftaran Penyelenggaraan dan Sistem
Transaksi Elektronik [Draft Regulation Concerning the Registration Procedure of Electronic System Provider],
art. 5, http://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/RPM%20tentang%20Tata%20Cara%20Pendaftaran%20
Penyelenggara%20Sistem%20Elektronik.pdf (Indon.) (Pricillia Haesanny, trans., translation on file with
authors).
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might be “public services” because, due to the nature of service-bundling,
these sites also often process paid digital content or offer other services. The
Indonesian Association of E-commerce (idEA) has criticized this interpretation
as inconsistent with regulations on public services.108
On January 7, 2014, the Ministry of Communication circulated a Draft
Regulation on Technical Guidelines on Data Centers, which would require
domestic data centers for disaster recovery for a broader range of
institutions.109 According to the Technology and Information Ministry’s Chief
of Public Relations Gatot S. Dewa Broto, the local data center mandate “covers
any institution that provides information technology-based services,” which as
a prescient reporter noted, is a definition which is broad enough that it could
include “hotels, banks, and airlines services as well as [Google and Yahoo].”110
As we’ll describe in Part II.C below, the costs and risks associated with
building out data centers in every country that one serves can make it
uneconomical to do so in many cases.
J. Malaysia
In 2010, Malaysia passed the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), which
requires data about Malaysians to be stored on local servers.111 Article 129(1)
provides, “A data user shall not transfer any personal data of a data subject to a
place outside Malaysia unless to such place as specified by the Minister, upon
the recommendation of the Commissioner, by notification published in the
Gazette.”112 The PDPA offers a set of exceptions, permitting the transfer of
data abroad under certain conditions: the data subject has given his consent to
the transfer; the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between
108

Enricko Lukman, Is the Indonesian Government Hurting or Helping the E-Commerce Industry?, TECH
ASIA (May 9, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.techinasia.com/indonesian-government-hurting-helpingecommerce-industry/.
109 Rancangan Peraturan Menteri (RPM) tentang Pedoman Teknis Pusat Data [Draft Regulation
Concerning the Technical Guidelines for Data Centers] (2013) (Indon.), available at
http://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/RPM%20PEDOMAN%20PUSAT%20DATA.pdf; Press Release,
Kominfo, Siaran Pers Tentang Uji Publik RPM Data Center [Press Release About Public Test RPM Data
Center] (Jan. 7, 2014) (Indon.), available at http://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/3731/Siaran+Pers+
No.+2-PIH-KOMINFO-1-2014+tentang+Uji+Publik+RPM+Data+Center+/0/siaran_pers#.UxBPWvldV6B.
110 Indonesia May Force Web Giants to Build Local Data Centers, ASIA SENTINEL (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.asiasentinel.com/econ-business/indonesia-web-giants-local-data-centers/; see also Vanesha
Manuturi & Basten Gokkon, Web Giants to Build Data Centers in Indonesia?, JAKARTA GLOBE (Jan. 15,
2014, 9:35 AM), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/web-giants-to-build-data-centers/.
111 Personal Data Protection Act 2010 § 129 (Act No. 709) (Malay.), available at
http://www.kkmm.gov.my/pdf/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Act%202010.pdf.
112 Id. art. 129(1).
IN
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the data subject and the data user; the transfer is necessary for the conclusion
or performance of a contract between the data user and a third party that is
either entered into at the request of the data subject or in his interest; the
transfer is in the exercise of or to defend a legal right; the transfer mitigates
adverse actions against the data subjects; reasonable precautions and all due
diligence to ensure compliance to conditions of the Act were taken; or the
transfer was necessary for the protection the data subject’s vital interests or for
the public interest as determined by the Minister.113 As we have indicated
above in our discussion of the Indian data localization obligations, a consent
requirement for transfer abroad can be difficult to satisfy. While it officially
entered into force on November 15, 2013, the PDPA has thus far not been
enforced.
K. Nigeria
To address Nigeria’s “clear negative trade balance” in the IT sector, the
Nigerian government has set a target of 50% locally supplied goods and
services in the information technology sector and has sought to achieve this
target through regulatory mandates.114 The National Information Technology
Development Agency (NITDA) released the Guidelines for Nigerian Content
Development in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in 2013,
requiring, in addition to a list of local content and usage of local hardware
requirements, that ICT companies must “[h]ost all subscriber and consumer
data locally within the country”115 and must “[h]ost their websites on .ng
TLD.”116 The Guidelines also mandate that data and information management
firms must “[h]ost government data locally within the country and shall not for
any reason host any government data outside the country without an express
approval.”117 The Guidelines provide a transition period for implementation.118

113

Id. art. 129(3).
Omobola Johnson, Minister of Commc’n Tech., Federal Ministry of Commc’n Tech., Remarks at the
e-Nigeria Conference 2013 in Abuja, Nigeria (Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://enigeria.gov.ng/2013/
Day%201/HM%20Remarks_e_Nigeria%20Dec%2003rd%202013_v5a.pdf.
115 Federal Ministry of Commc’n Tech., Guidelines for Nigerian Content Development in Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) § 12.1.4, at 19 (2013), available at http://www.nitda.gov.ng/documents/
Guidelines%20on%20Nigerian%20Content%20Developmenet%20in%20ICT%20updated%20on%201206201
4.pdf.
116 Id. § 12.1.5, at 19.
117 Id. § 14.1.2, at 23.
118 See id. § 1.0, at 4.
114
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L. Russia
Following the NSA revelations in the summer of 2013, Sergei Zheleznyak,
a deputy speaker of the lower house of the Russian parliament and a member
of the Committee on Information Policy and Information Technology and
Communications, called on Russia to strengthen its “digital sovereignty”
through “legislation requiring e-mail and social networking companies [to]
retain the data of Russian clients on servers inside Russia, where they would be
subject to domestic law enforcement search warrants.”119
In spring 2013, the Minsvyazi (Russian Ministry of Communications)
drafted an order forcing telecommunications and Internet providers “to install
equipment allowing data collection and retention on their servers for a
minimum of 12 hours.”120 This obligation seems to be directed not at the
websites themselves but at Internet service providers that carry data between
users and computer servers. By requiring Russian Internet service providers to
save data locally, it serves as a data localization requirement, not preventing
data from leaving but at least requiring a copy to be stored locally. This order
gives the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) “direct access to a wider
range of data than was possible before—including users’ phone numbers,
account details on popular domestic and overseas online resources (like Gmail,
Yandex, Mail.ru etc [sic]), IP addresses and location data—without a court
order, for the purposes of national anti-terrorist investigations.”121 On July 21,
2014, President Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law No. 242—which amended
Federal Law No. 152 “On Personal Data” of July 27, 2006122—to prohibit the
storing of Russians’ personal data outside the Russian Federation.123 Moreover,
119 Andrew E. Kramer, N.S.A. Leaks Revive Push in Russia to Control Net, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/global/nsa-leaks-stir-plans-in-russia-to-controlnet.html; Maria Makutina, Lawmakers Seek to Bolster Russia’s Internet Sovereignty, RUSS. BEYOND
HEADLINES (June 21, 2013), http://rbth.ru/politics/2013/06/21/lawmakers_seek_to_bolster_russias_internet_
sovereignty_27365.html.
120 Alexandra Kulikova, Data Collection and Retention in Russia: Going Beyond the Privacy and Security
Debate, GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.gp-digital.org/gpd-update/data-collectionand-retention-in-russia/.
121 Id.
122 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Personal’nykh Data [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Personal
Data], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 27, 2006, No. 152, available at http://www.rg.ru/
2006/07/29/personaljnye-dannye-dok.html, translation available at https://www.privacyassociation.org/
media/pdf/knowledge_center/Russian_Federal_Law_on_Personal_Data.pdf (Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Prof’ls,
trans.).
123 Federal’nyj Zakon Rossijskoj Federacii “O Vnesenii Izmenenij v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye Akty
Rossijskoj Federacii v Časti Utočnenija Porjadka Obrabotki Personal’nyh Dannyh v InformacionnoTelekommunikacionnyh Setjah” [Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Amendments to Certain
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operators of these databases must disclose the physical locations of
datacenters.124 Online websites that violate the prohibition could be placed on
the Roscomnadzor’s (Federal Communications Supervisory Service’s)
blacklist of websites, generally reserved for those promoting drugs and child
pornography.125
This law followed on the heels of Federal Law No. 97, or the “Blogger’s
Law,” which seeks to oversee blogging on the Internet, and introduces another
data localization mandate.126 The legislation requires that individuals or legal
entities who organize the dissemination of information, or the exchange of
information between Internet users, to store all information about the arrival,
transmission, delivery, and processing of voice data, written text, images,
sounds, or other kinds of action for six months in Russia.127 A major firm
noted that these “[t]wo developments in Russian law . . . could significantly
limit the ability of cloud and other online services to publish online content and
to make Russian data remotely available online.”128

Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Clarification of the Processing of Personal Data in
Information and Telecommunication Networks”], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 23, 2014, No. 242,
available at http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/23/persdannye-dok.html; see also Maria Puzrakova, Recent
Amendments to the Procedure of Personal Data Processing in Russia, WHITE & CASE LLP (Sept. 2014),
http://www.whitecase.com/articles/092014/recent-amendments-to-the-procedure-of-personal-data-processingin-russia/#.VEl-NskhCkM; Leonid Zubarev & Elena Baryshnikova, The Storage and Processing of Russian
Citizens’ Personal Data in Databases Located Outside Russia to be Banned, CMS (Aug. 2014),
http://www.cms-russia.info/legalnews/2014/07/cms_client_alert_2014_07_31.html
(explaining
Russian
citizens’ personal data will only be stored on Russian Databases and noting exceptions such as when there is
interference to achieving objectives of international treaties and the administration of justice).
124 Federal Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, art. 2.2.
125 Max Smolaks, Russian Government Will Force Companies to Store Citizen Data Locally, TECHWEEK
EUROPE (July 4, 2014, 17:22), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-government-will-forcecompanies-store-citizen-data-locally-148560.
126 Federal’nyj Zakon “O Vnesenii Izmenenij v Federal’nyj zakon, ‘Ob Informacii, Informacionnyh
Tehnologijah i o Zaŝite Informacii’ i Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye akty Rossijskoj Federacii po Voprosam
Uporjadočenija Obmena Informaciej s Ispol’zovaniem Informacionno-Telekommunikacionnyh Setej” [Federal
Law “On Amending the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies and Protection of
Information’ and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Streaming the Exchange of
Information with the Use of Information-Telecommunications Networks”], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.]
May 5, 2014, art. 1.1, available at http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/07/informtech-dok.html. For a general overview
of the regulation, see Natalia Gulyaeva & Maria Sedykh, Russia Enacts Data Localization Requirement; New
Rules Restricting Online Content Come into Effect, HOGAN LOVELLS (July 18, 2014),
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2014/07/articles/international-eu-privacy/russia-enacts-new-online-datalaws/.
127 See Federal Law of May 5, 2014, art. 1.1; see also Russia’s Parliament Prepares New “AntiTerrorist” Laws for Internet, GLOBAL VOICES (Jan. 16, 2014, 5:51 GMT), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.
org/2014/01/16/russias-parliament-prepares-new-anti-terrorist-laws-for-internet-censorship-putin/.
128 Gulyaeva & Sedykh, supra note 126.
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M. South Korea
In March 2011, South Korea promulgated a comprehensive regulation on
data through the Personal Information Protection Act, covering both the private
and public sectors.129 Article 17(3) of the Act targets data exports for a special
protection regime: “When a personal information manager provides a third
person at any overseas location with personal information, he/she shall notify a
subject of information of the matters referred to . . . and obtain the consent
thereto.”130
The law requires the data exporter to provide the data subject (the person to
whom the data relates) with extensive information about the data transfer.
Article 17(2) provides that data subjects must be informed of the following:
1. A recipient of personal information; 2. Purposes for which a
recipient of personal information uses such information; 3. Items of
personal information to provide; 4. Period for which a recipient of
personal information holds and uses such information; 5. The fact
that a subject of information has a right to reject to give his/her
consent and details of a disadvantage, if any, due to his/her rejection
to give consent.131

As we described in the discussion of similar rules in India, these obligations
significantly limit the use of foreign cloud computing services and also third
party information services providers generally.
Another data localization measure comes from an unexpected source. In
1961, post-war South Korea enacted the Land Survey Act seeking, among
other things, to prevent hostile powers from obtaining maps of the country.132
Similar provisions were replaced in 2009 by the Act on Land Survey,
129

Gaein jeong boboho beop [Personal Information Protection Act], Act. No. 10465, Mar. 29, 2011, art 1,
amended by Act. No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013 (S. Kor.), translated in 33 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(Korea Legislation Res. Inst. 2014), available at http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq
=22038&lang=ENG. The Personal Information Protection Act replaced the Public Agency Data Protection Act
and—in part in relation to the private sector—the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications
Network Utilization and Information Protection.
130 Id. art. 17(3).
131 Id. art. 17(2).
132 Land Survey Act, Act. No. 938, Dec. 31, 1961, art. 16 (forbidding records of survey measurements and
pictures of maps from being taken out of the country), repealed by Act on Land Survey, Waterway Survey and
Cadastral Records, Act. No. 9774, June 9, 2009 (S. Kor.). For the current version of the law in force, see Act
on Land Survey, Waterway Survey and Cadastral Records, Act. No. 12738, June 3, 2014 (S. Kor.), translated
in 31 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Korea Legislation Res. Inst. 2014), available at
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=32771&lang=ENG.
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Waterway Survey and Cadastral Records, which has been amended several
times, most recently in 2014. According to Article 16 of the Act,
(1) No person shall take abroad maps, etc. . . . without permission of
the Minster of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs . . .
(2) No person shall take abroad the results of a fundamental survey
where [the act would harm national security or other important
national interests or where such information is prescribed as a
confidential matter].133

The constraint in this law continues to this day,134 and it has been
interpreted recently as outlawing mapping data from being held on computer
servers outside the country.135 This has effectively limited the provision of
online mapping services to Korean Internet companies such as Naver and
Daum and not foreign companies that use foreign servers. A Japanese tourist,
for example, found that she could not use Google Maps to navigate in South
Korea.136 The constraints also pose a hurdle to companies that provide services
built on top of the foreign services’ APIs (application programming interfaces),
thereby hampering the development of domestic innovations using global
tools, an issue we return to in Part II.C below.
N. Vietnam
In 2013, the Vietnamese government promulgated a lengthy and
comprehensive decree seeking to control speech on the Internet. The Decree on
Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Information Content
Online (Decree 72),137 which became effective on September 1, 2013, bans the
use of the Internet to criticize the government or to do anything else to harm
“national security, social order and safety.”138 Decree 72 also requires a range
of Internet service providers to maintain within Vietnam a copy of any
133 Act. No. 12738, June 3, 2014, art. 16 (concerning the results from a “fundamental survey”); see also
id. art. 21 (concerning the results from a “public survey”).
134 See supra note 133.
135 See Geun Ho LiIm, Hangyeong → Seouryeok Geomsaek Haessdeoni. . .Geonmul Wiro Naragarago?
Hangug Eseoman Gil Moschajneun Gugeuljido [Searching Directions from HanKyung to Seoul Station. . .Fly
over Buildings? Google Map Cannot Navigate only in Korea], KOREA ECON. DAILY (Dec. 9, 2013, 21:10:50),
http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2013120998951 (S. Kor.).
136 Id.
137 Decree on Management, Provision and Use of Internet Services and Online Information (No. 72/2013)
(Viet.), available at http://www.moit.gov.vn/Images/FileVanBan/_ND72-2013-CPEng.pdf.
138 Id. art. 5(1)(a) (declaring it illegal to use the Internet to “[oppose] the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
[or] threaten[] the national security, social order and safety”).
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information they hold in order to facilitate the inspection of information by
authorities, specifically, providing that organizations and enterprises must
“have at least [one] server system in Vietnam serving the inspection, storage,
and provision of information at the request of competent authorities.”139
The Decree applies to general websites, social networks, mobile networks,
and game service providers.140 Unlike many other countries, Vietnam’s focus
is not in protecting the privacy of the information from foreign surveillance but
in ensuring that information is available to local authorities that want ready
access to it.
In October 2013, the Ministry of Information and Communications
circulated a draft circular providing additional implementation details for
Decree 72. The draft circular again affirms that a central goal of that decree is
to assist local authorities in accessing information. The draft circular requires
that the local server must meet the following requirements:

139

1.

Storing all user registration information that allows users to
connect and authenticate user information with personal
identification number system at the request of the competent
state agencies.

2.

Storing the entire history of the information posting activities on
the general information websites and user information provision
and sharing on social networks.

3.

Allowing the conduct and storage of all the activities relating to
censoring information posted on general information websites
and social networks.

4.

When there are requirements arising from the server system
located in Viet Nam, the entire server system located outside
Viet Nam must meet those requirements.

5.

Permitting full conduct of inspection and examination activities
at any given time as required by the competent authority as well
as the settlement of users’ complaints in accordance with the
user agreements of general information websites, social
networks, and relevant regulations.141

Id. art. 24(2).
See id. (general websites); id. art. 25(8) (social networks); id. art. 28(2) (mobile networks);
id. art. 34(2) (game service providers).
141 Draft Circular Detailing a Number of Articles re Management of Websites and Social Networks under
the Government’s Decree No. 72/2013/ND-CP of 15 July 2013 Regarding the Management, Provision and Use
140
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The draft circular also requires that any “general information website” or
social network must have a high-level person responsible for content
management who must be a Vietnamese national and reside in Vietnam.142
Thus, not only must the data reside in Vietnam, so must a high-level executive
of the company.
O. Others
Kazakhstan—Since 2005, Kazakhstan has required that all domestically
registered domain names (i.e., those on the “.kz” top level domain) operate on
physical servers within the country.143 The government took steps to enforce
this regulation in late 2010, causing Google to redirect traffic from Google.kz
to Google.com.144 The redirect caused search queries to return results that were
not customized for Kazakhstan.145 The Kazakhstani Association of IT
Companies later required that the domestic server requirements apply only to
new domains registered after September 7, 2010.146 This allowed Google
(which had registered its name well before this date) to restore the Google.kz
site, but domestic or foreign companies registering a domain name after this
date could no longer rely on global cloud-based services.
Scandinavian Countries—The Scandinavian data protection authorities
have expressed concerns about the use of foreign cloud computing services,
of Internet Services and Online Information, Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communication,
available at http://mic.gov.vn/Attachment%20Lay%20Y%20Kien%20Nhan%20Dan/Du%20thao%20thong%
20tu%20MXH%20(Du%20thao%203%20ngay%204.%209).doc (translation by author).
142 Id. art. 3. This provision sets forth conditions for granting a license to establish general information
websites and social networks, which include the following specifications:
1. Management personnel:
The person responsible for content management is the head of the organization, the head of
the enterprise or the person who is authorized by the head of an organization, the head of an
enterprise. The authorized person must be deputy head-level in an organization and an enterprise;
must have Vietnamese nationality, permanent residence or temporary residence address in
Vietnam, and must be an university graduate or equivalents or higher . . . .
Id.

143

FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 8, at 441.
Bill Coughran, Changes to the Open Internet in Kazakhstan, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (June 14, 2011,
7:40 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/changes-to-open-internet-in-kazakhstan.html (“[T]he
Kazakhstan Network Information Centre notified us of an order issued by the Ministry of Communications and
Information in Kazakhstan that requires all .kz domain names, such as google.kz, to operate on physical
servers within the borders of that country.”).
145 Id.
146 See id.; see also Google.kz Vernulsya v Kazakhstan [Google.kz Returned to Kazakhstan],
TENGRINEWS.KZ (June 15, 2011, 10:20), http://tengrinews.kz/internet/190571/ (Kaz.).
144
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though their interpretations have been largely untested in court. In 2011, the
Danish Data Protection Agency denied the city of Odense permission to
transfer “data concerning health, serious social problems, and other purely
private matters” to Google Apps, citing security concerns.147 In 2012, the
Norwegian data authority concluded that cities could not use cloud computing
services unless the servers were located within the EU, but then lifted the ban
on the use of Google Apps a short time later.148
Sweden’s Datainspektionen (Data Inspection Board) has given a number of
interpretations on whether the use of services that place data abroad violates
Swedish data processing law. It concluded that the town of Salem could not
use Google cloud services, in part because Google could not guarantee that any
subcontractor they used abroad would follow the Safe Harbor.149 Google’s
standard enterprise contract, however, promises that any subcontractor will
meet the standards of the Safe Harbor, and Google also provides for the
possibility that it will follow the Model Contract Clauses established by the
European Commission to meet the requirements of European data protection
law.150 The Datainspektionen did eventually approve the use of Dropbox, a
U.S.-based cloud service.151

147 Processing of Sensitive Personal Data in a Cloud Solution, DATATILSYNET (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/processing-of-sensitive-personal-data-in-a-cloud-solution/.
148 See Norwegian Data Inspectorate, Notification of Decision – New E-mail Solution Within Narvik Local
Authority (Narvik Commune) – Google Apps, DATATILSYNET (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.datatilsynet.no/
Global/english/2012_narvik_google_eng.pdf (decision to ban service); Use of Cloud Computing Services,
DATATILSYNET (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.datatilsynet.no/English/Publications/cloud-computing/ (reporting
on the decision to lift the ban); see also Loek Essers, Norway Ends Nine-Month Ban on Google Apps,
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 26, 2012, 2:27 PM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2491685/cloudcomputing/norway-ends-nine-month-ban-on-google-apps-use.html.
149 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Data Protection in Cloud Computing – The Swedish Perspective, 28
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 476, 476–77 (2012); Tillsyn enligt personuppgiftslagen (1998:204) –
Uppföljning av beslut i ärende 263-2011 [Supervision Under the Personal Data Act (1998: 204) – Monitoring
of Decision in Case 263-2011], DATAINSPEKTIONEN (May 31, 2013), http://www.datainspektionen.se/
Documents/beslut/2013-05-31-salems-kommun.pdf (Swed.); Liam Tung, Sweden Tells Council to Stop Using
Google Apps, ZDNET (June 14, 2013, 13:46 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/sweden-tells-council-to-stop-usinggoogle-apps-7000016850/. Also, in 2013, the Datainspektionen refused to endorse the Sollentuna
municipality’s cloud service contract with Google, though that interpretation too is being contested. See Jonas
Ryberg, Storbråk om Google Apps [Large Fraction of Google Apps], COMPUTERSWEDEN (Sept. 17, 2013,
09:45), http://computersweden.idg.se/2.2683/1.523293/storbrak-om-google-apps (Swed.).
150 Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Enterprise Agreement, GOOGLE, https://www.google.
com/intx/en/enterprise/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). The Model Contract Clauses
provide for “prior written consent” before the use of subprocessors by the data importer. See Commission
Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses, supra note 75.
151 Svantesson, supra note 149, at 479.
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Taiwan—Article 21 of Taiwan’s Personal Data Protection Act152 permits
government agencies the authority to restrict international transfers in the
industries they regulate, under certain conditions such as when the information
involves major national interests, by treaty or agreement, inadequate
protection, or when the foreign transfer is utilized to avoid Taiwanese laws.153
Thailand—Thailand is considering a comprehensive data protection
framework.154 The draft Personal Information Protection Act would require
that before an overseas data transfer is executed, the data subjects must give
specific consent in writing to overseas transfers, and the recipient country’s
personal data protection law must be deemed adequate.155
P. Summary of Data Localization Mandates
We summarize below the means employed and rationales offered for the
data localization mandates that are in place or being considered in the
jurisdictions surveyed.
Country
Australia

Regulation
Section 77 of the Personally Controlled
Electronic Health Records (PCEHR) Act
prohibits the transfer of health records outside
of Australia.

Rationale Cited
Users’ privacy and
security

152 Taiwan passed the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law (CPPDP) and associated rules
in 1995. In 2010, the CPPDP was amended and renamed the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA).
PIPA came into effect on October 1, 2012.
153 Personal Information Protection Act (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, May 26, 2010), art. 21
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0050021. The act provides
for the following exceptions:

1. Where it involves major national interests; 2. Where [a] national treaty or agreement specifies
otherwise; 3. Where the country receiving personal information lacks of proper regulations
towards the protection of personal information and it might harm the rights and interests of the
Party; 4. Where international transmission of personal information is made through an indirect
method in which the provisions of this Law may not be applicable.
Id. Taiwan’s National Communications Commission issued an order prohibiting all Taiwanese
telecommunications and broadcasting industries from transferring customer data to the People’s Republic of
China, citing reasons of inadequate protection. See Ken-Ying Tseng & Rebecca Hsiao, Taiwan, in GETTING
THE DEAL THROUGH: DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY IN 26 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 2014, at 166 (2014),
available at http://www.leeandli.com/dl.aspx?filecode=1728.
154 Phrarāchbaronal trûmkhrxng k̄ ĥxmūl s̄ wn bukhkhl [Personal Data Protection Act] (Tentative Draft,
̀
2012) (Thai.), translation available at http://media.mofo.com/docs/mofoprivacy/Thai%20data%20protection
%20bill.doc.
155 Id. § 16.
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Country
Brazil

Regulation
A draft Marco Civil Proposal would have
permitted the Executive branch to require
Internet providers to use local structure for
storage and dissemination of data.

Rationale Cited
Users’ privacy and
security, foreign
surveillance156

Canada
(British
Columbia &
Nova Scotia)

Laws requiring personal information held by
public bodies to be stored and accessed only
in Canada unless certain exceptions apply.

Foreign
157
surveillance

China

The People’s Bank of China prohibits
financial institutions from storing or
processing personal information relating to
identity, property, account, credit, and
financial transactions outside of China.

Users’ privacy and
security

The Information Security Technology
Guidelines for Personal Information
Protection within Public and Commercial
Services Information System (the Guidelines)
prohibit the transfer of personal data abroad
without express consent of the data subject or
explicit regulatory approval.

Users’ privacy and
security158

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Guarding State Secrets prohibits data deemed
states secrets from being transferred outside of
China.

National security,
foreign surveillance

The European Union’s 1995 Data Protection
Directive permits transfer of personal data if
another jurisdiction provides adequate
protection, there is a contractual arrangement
with foreign company or through the Safe
Harbor.

Users’ privacy and
security

European
Union

156
157
158

Statement by Dilma Rousseff, supra note 20.
CATE, supra note 26.
See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
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Country
European
Union
(continued)

Regulation
The proposed General Data Protection
Regulation permits the transfer of data outside
European Union if there are appropriate
safeguards such as binding corporate rules,
valid European Data Protection Seal for both
controllers and recipients, standard data
protection clauses, or contractual clauses
authorized by a state data protection authority.

Rationale Cited
Users’ privacy and
security

France

Proposed to tax the collection, management,
and commercial exploitation of personal data
generated by users located in France.

Users’ privacy and
security; economic
development159

The Military Programming Law permits
security forces and intelligence services to see
electronic and digital communications in real
time.

National security,
foreign surveillance

The Conference of German Data Protection
Commissioners suspended personal
international data transfer approvals upon
determining that the Safe Harbor and the
standard contractual clauses have a
“substantial likelihood” of violations.

Foreign
surveillance160

Deutsche Telekom proposed that data between
Germans should be routed inside German
networks. Chancellor Angela Merkel
supported this proposal and promoted the
expansion of the concept to the European
Union.

Users’ privacy and
security, foreign
surveillance161

The Information Technology Rules prohibit
the transfer of “sensitive personal data or
information” abroad unless the data subject
consented to the transfer or the transfer is
“necessary.”

National security

Germany

India

159
160
161

COLLIN & COLIN, supra note 65.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77–83.
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Regulation
The Public Records Act of 1993 prohibits
public records from being transferred out of
Indian territory, except for public purposes.
The Act barred the transfer of government
emails outside of India.

Rationale Cited
National security,
foreign surveillance

The National Security Council proposes
(1) that email service providers must host
servers in India, (2) data generated from
within India must be hosted in India, and
(3) that mirroring of data to servers abroad is
prohibited.

National security162

Regulation 82 on the Operation of Electronic
System and Transaction Operation requires
public service providers to place data centers
within the country.

Law enforcement,
national sovereignty,
user’s security

Draft Regulation on Technical Guidelines on
Data Center requires any institutions that
provide information technology-based
services to build local disaster recovery data
centers.

Users’ security

Malaysia

The Personal Data Protection Act prohibits
the transfer of personal data abroad unless
specified by the Minister or subjected to
certain exceptions including the consent and
“necessity” requirements.

Users’ privacy and
security163

Nigeria

Nigeria National Information Technology
Development Agency’s Guidelines for
Nigerian Content Development in Information
and Communications Technology require ICT
companies to host all consumer and
government data locally within the country.

Economic
development164

Indonesia

162

See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim, Malaysia’s Information, Communication, and Culture Minister, stated that
Malaysia enacted the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010 “not only because of rapid commercial
development involving violations of personal data such as credit status of individuals, but also invasion
through the means of communication tools being detected and questioned.” Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim,
Protecting Your Personal Data, STAR (May 24, 2013, 10:24:27 PM MYT), http://www.thestar.com.my/
News/Nation/2012/02/12/Protecting-your-personal-data/.
164 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
163
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Regulation
Federal Law No. 242 prohibits the storing of
Russians’ personal data outside of the Russian
Federation.

Rationale Cited
Users’ privacy and
security, foreign
surveillance,165
national security

Federal Law No. 97 requires individuals and
legal entities who are information organizers
on the Internet to store all data for at least six
months in Russian territory.

Users’ privacy and
security, foreign
surveillance,
national security

The Ministry of Communications drafted an
order requiring telecommunications and
Internet providers to install equipment
allowing data collection and retention on their
servers for at least twelve hours.

National security,
domestic law
enforcement

The Personal Information Protection Act
requires information processors to inform and
obtain consent from data subjects for
transferring personal information to third
party overseas.

Users’ privacy and
security

The Land Survey, Waterway Survey and
Cadastral Records Act of 2009—replacing the
Land Survey Act of 1961—prohibits basic
land survey and maps information from being
transferred outside the South Korea without
authorization of the Minister of Land,
Transport and Maritime Affairs.

National security

See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
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The Decree on Management, Provision, and
Use of Internet Services and Information
Content Online (Decree 72) requires Internet
service providers to place at least a local
server inside Vietnamese territory for law
enforcement purposes.
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Rationale Cited
Domestic law
enforcement,166
users’ privacy and
security167

II. ANALYSIS
The country studies above reveal the pervasive efforts across the world to
erect barriers to the global Internet. But can these measures that break the
World Wide Web be justified by important domestic policy rationales?
Governments offer a variety of arguments for data localization, from avoiding
foreign surveillance to promoting users’ security and privacy to bolstering
domestic law enforcement and securing domestic economic development. We
consider below these four justifications, as well as the costs they will impose
on the economic development and political and social freedom across the
world.
We leave for a later study a crucial additional concern—the fundamental
tension between data localization and trade liberalization obligations.168 Data
166 Nguyễn Dũng [Dung Nguyen], Bộ Trưởng Nguyễn Bắc Son: Nghị định 72 Bảo Vệ Lợi Ích Người Dùng
Internet [Minister Nguyễn Bắc Son: Decree 72 Protects the Interests of Internet Users], INFONET.VN (Aug. 31,
2013, 06:30), http://infonet.vn/bo-truong-nguyen-bac-son-nghi-dinh-72-bao-ve-loi-ich-nguoi-dung-internetpost96412.info (Viet.) (Interview with Minister of Information and Communications Nguyen Bac Son: “Nghị
định 72 là cơ sở pháp lý quan trọng để Bộ TT&TT và các cơ quan chức năng xử lý các trang mạng tự ý khai
thác, sử dụng thông tin từ các báo mà không được phép, tự ý biên tập làm thay đổi nội dung tác phẩm báo chí.
Đây là các hành vi vi phạm luật về bản quyền, gây tổn hại về uy tín, hiệu quả hoạt động của các cơ quan báo
chí.” [“Decree 72 is an important legal instrument for the Ministry of Information and Communications and
government authorities to manage websites that exploit and use news and information published by news
agencies without permission and those that independently edit and alter the content of news articles. These are
activities that infringe copyrights law, damage reputation, and undermine the operation of news agencies.”]
(translation by author)).
167 Id. (“Trước khi có Nghị định 72, các cơ quan chức năng của Việt Nam cũng đã truy tìm ra được những
thủ phạm đã mạo danh gây tổn hại về uy tín, tài sản của người khác để xử lý theo pháp luật. Nghị định 72
chính là cơ sở pháp lý bảo đảm cho việc truy tìm và xử lý các hành vi sai phạm trên được thực hiện nhanh
chóng, thuận lợi và hiệu quả hơn.” [“Before the enactment of Decree 72, Vietnamese authorities already have
the legal authority to prosecute offenders who, through impersonation or identity theft, harm others’ reputation
and finance. Decree 72 is the legal instrument to guarantee that wrongdoings can be prosecuted more
efficiently.”] (translation by author)).
168 For important prior work on related issues, see GOOGLE, INC., ENABLING TRADE IN THE ERA OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES: BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION (2009);
NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, PROMOTING CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS: PRIORITIES FOR THE BUSINESS
COMMUNITY (2013), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/Innovation/PromotingCrossBorderDataFlows
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localization makes impossible the forms of global business that have appeared
over the last two decades, allowing the provision of information services
across borders. Moreover, protectionist policies barring access to foreign
services only invite reciprocal protectionism from one’s trading partners,
harming consumers and businesses alike in the process by denying them access
to the world’s leading services.
A. Foreign Surveillance
Beginning on June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian shocked
the world with revelations that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had
been secretly intercepting personal data of individuals and dignitaries
domestically and abroad.169 Through internal records released by Edward
Snowden, a technical specialist working for the NSA, the NSA was accused of
monitoring more than thirty-five world leaders170 and intercepting
communications from more than 50,000 computer systems worldwide.171
Anger at disclosures of U.S. surveillance abroad has led some countries to
respond by attempting to keep data from leaving their shores, lest it fall into
U.S. or other foreign governmental hands. For example, India’s former Deputy
National Security Advisor, Nehchal Sandhu, reportedly sought ways to route
domestic Internet traffic via servers within the country, arguing that “[s]uch an
arrangement would limit the capacity of foreign elements to scrutinize intraIndia traffic.”172 The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa) are seeking to establish an international network of cables that would
create “a network free of US eavesdropping.”173 But does data localization in
NFTC.pdf; Joshua Meltzer, Supporting the Internet as a Platform for International Trade Opportunities for
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Developing Countries (Brookings Inst., Working Paper No. 69,
2014),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2014/02/internet%20
international%20trade%20meltzer/02%20international%20trade%20version%202.pdf.
169 Greenwald, supra note 2; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 15.23 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. For a review of the major revelations, see Ewen MacAskill &
Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1.
170 James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed Over Contacts,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013, 02.50 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillanceworld-leaders-calls.
171 Floor Boon, Steven Derix & Huib Modderkolk, NSA Infected 50,000 Computer Networks with
Malicious Software, NRC.NL (NETH.) (Nov. 23, 2013, 02:40), http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsainfected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/.
172 See Thomas, supra note 3.
173 Paul Joseph Watson, BRICS Countries Build New Internet to Avoid NSA Spying, INFOWARS.COM (Oct.
24, 2013), http://www.infowars.com/brics-countries-build-new-internet-to-avoid-nsa-spying/.
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fact stave off foreign surveillance? There are significant reasons to be skeptical
of this claim.
First, the United States, like many countries, concentrates much of its
surveillance efforts abroad. Indeed, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is
focused on gathering information overseas, limiting data gathering largely only
when it implicates U.S. persons.174 The recent NSA surveillance disclosures
have revealed extensive foreign operations.175 Indeed, constraints on domestic
operations may well have spurred the NSA to expand operations abroad. As
the Washington Post reports, “Intercepting communications overseas has clear
advantages for the NSA, with looser restrictions and less oversight.”176
Deterred by a 2011 ruling by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
barring certain broad domestic surveillance of Internet and telephone traffic,177
the NSA may have increasingly turned its attention overseas.
Second, the use of malware eliminates even the need to have operations on
the ground in the countries in which surveillance occurs. The Dutch newspaper
NRC Handelsblad reports that the NSA has infiltrated every corner of the
world through a network of malicious malware.178 A German computer expert
noted that “data was intercepted here [by the NSA] on a large scale.”179 The
NRC Handelsblad suggests that the NSA has even scaled the Great Firewall of
China,180 demonstrating that efforts to keep information inside a heavily
secured and monitored ironclad firewall do not necessarily mean that it cannot
be accessed by those on the other side of the earth. This is a commonplace
phenomenon on the Internet, of course. The recent enormous security breach of
millions of Target customers in the United States likely sent credit card data of

174

See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012).
Andrea Peterson, The NSA’s Global Spying Operation in One Map, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/17/the-nsas-global-spying-operation-in-onemap/.
176 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e5
1d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
177 FISA
Court Ruling on Illegal NSA E-mail Collection Program, WASH. POST,
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collectionprogram/409/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
178 Boon, Derix & Modderkolk, supra note 171.
179 Gabriel Borrud, Germany Looks to Erect IT Barrier, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://www.dw.de/germany-looks-to-erect-it-barrier/a-17203480.
180 Boon, Derix & Modderkolk, supra note 171.
175
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Americans to servers in Russia, perhaps through the installation of malware on
point-of-sale devices in stores.181
Third, while governments denounce foreign surveillance on behalf of their
citizens, governments routinely share clandestinely intercepted information
with each other.182 The Guardian reports that Australia’s intelligence agency
collects and shares bulk data of Australian nationals with its partners—the
United States, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand (collectively known as the
“5-Eyes”).183 Even while the German government has been a forceful critic of
NSA surveillance, the German intelligence service has been described as a
“prolific partner” of the NSA.184 Der Spiegel reports that the German foreign
intelligence agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) has been collaborating
with the NSA, passing about 500 million pieces of metadata in the month of
December 2012 alone.185 The NSA has collaborated with the effort led by the
British intelligence agency Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) to hack into Yahoo!’s webchat service to access unencrypted webcam
images of millions of users.186 A German computer expert observes, “We
know now that data was intercepted here on a large scale. So limiting traffic to
Germany and Europe doesn’t look as promising as the government and
[Deutsche Telekom] would like you to believe.”187
Fourth, far from making surveillance more difficult for a foreign
government, localization requirements might in fact make it easier. By
compelling companies to use local services rather than global ones, there is a
greater likelihood of choosing companies with weak security measures. By
181 See Brian Krebs, Hacker Ring Stole 160 Million Credit Cards, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 13, 2013,
3:39 PM ET), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/07/hacker-ring-stole-160-million-credit-cards/ (describing
Russians indicted in the United States for earlier identity theft of Americans).
182 See infra note 276 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
information sharing procedures.
183 Ewan MacAskill, James Ball & Katharine Murphy, Revealed: Australian Spy Agency Offered to Share
Data About Ordinary Citizens, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2013, 19:20 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/dec/02/revealed-australian-spy-agency-offered-to-share-data-about-ordinary-citizens.
184 ‘Prolific Partner’: German Intelligence Used NSA Spy Program, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L, (July 20,
2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agencies-used-nsa-spyingprogram-a-912173.html.
185 Hubert Gude, Laura Poitras & Marcel Rosenbach, Mass Data: Transfers from Germany Aid US
Surveillance, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Aug. 5, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html.
186 Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images Intercepted by
GCHQ, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014, 05.31 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsawebcam-images-internet-yahoo.
187 Borrud, supra note 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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their very nature, the global services are subject to intense worldwide
competition, while local services—protected by the data localization
requirements—might have less need to offer stronger security to attract
customers, and fewer resources to do so, than companies with a global scale.
Weaker security makes such systems easier targets for foreign surveillance.
This is what we call the “Protected Local Provider” problem.
Fifth, data localization might actually facilitate foreign surveillance.
Centralizing information about users in a locality might actually ease the
logistical burdens of foreign intelligence agencies, which can now concentrate
their surveillance of a particular nation’s citizens more easily. We call this the
“Jackpot” problem.
Finally, we note that the United States is hardly alone in laws empowering
authorities to order corporations to share data of private persons. A recent
study shows that such powers are widespread.188 Indeed, some other states
permit access to data without requiring a court order.189 That is, one state could
require a multinational Internet service provider to store all its data on local
servers, but that fact does not bar another state from requiring the same
multinational provider to turn over data on those servers.
One data localization measure—South Korea’s requirement that mapping
data be stored in the country—seems especially difficult to defend. After all,
under the rules, one can access South Korean maps from abroad freely, as long

188 See WINSTON MAXWELL & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, HOGAN LOVELLS, A GLOBAL REALITY:
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO DATA IN THE CLOUD 3 (rev. ed. 2012), available at
http://www.hldataprotection.com/uploads/file/Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%20Cloud%20Data
%20Paper%20(18%20July%2012).pdf [hereinafter HOGAN LOVELLS WHITE PAPER].
189 In France, the government can obtain data directly from ISPs without a court order. Loi No. 2006-64
du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité
et aux contrôles frontaliers [Law 2006-64 of January 23, 2006, Anti-Terror Act], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 24, 2006, p. 19 (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006053177.
Under
Germany’s
Telecommunications Act, the government has a right to request data stored by telecommunications companies
to advance certain prosecutorial and protective functions. Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG]
[Telecommunications Act] June 22, 2004, BGBL. I at 1190, § 112 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/tkg_2004/index.html, translation available at, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/
telekommunkationsgesetz-en,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf. A member of the
Irish Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent may request a service provider to disclose to
that member data retained by the service provider under certain conditions. Communications (Retention of
Data) Act (Act No. 3/2011), § 6 (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2011/en/act/pub/0003/
print.html.

CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2

718

2/19/2015 12:30 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:677

as services are themselves based in South Korea.190 Thus, if a foreigner wants
to access online maps of South Korea, it simply needs to turn to Naver and
Daum, services that use servers located in that country.191 As Yonsei
University Business School Professor Ho Geun Lee stated, should North Korea
want, it can use Naver and Daum’s services to view street maps and
photographs of streets.192
In sum, as Emma Llansó of the U.S.-based Center for Technology and
Democracy warns with respect to Brazil’s attempt to block information from
leaving that country, data localization “would not necessarily keep Brazilians’
data out of the NSA’s hands.”193 One security professional observes, “The only
way to really make anything that is NSA proof is to not have it connect to the
Internet.”194
B. Privacy and Security
Closely related to the goal of avoiding foreign surveillance through data
localization is the goal of protecting the privacy and security of personal
information against nongovernmental criminal activities. As the country
studies above show, the laws of many countries make it difficult to transfer
personal data outside of national borders in the name of privacy and security.
While these laws are not explicitly designed to localize data, by creating
significant barriers to the export of data, they operate as data localization
measures.

190 A user in the United States can access maps of South Korea via either Naver or Daum. See supra notes
132–36 and accompanying text.
191 Additionally, one might note that sensitive locations such as the Blue House (the President’s
residence) or military compounds can be removed from foreign services, as well as domestic ones, at the
request of the South Korean government. Lan Goh, ‘Jido, Haeoe Ban Chul Hamyeon Cheobeol’ 50nyeon Jeon
Gasie Changjog Hyeongje Balmok [Punishment Imposed if Map Data is Exported Overseas, “Creative
Economy” Impeded by 50-year-old Thorn], JOONGANG ILBO (S. Kor.) (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=12380240&cloc=olink|article|default (noting that
sensitive information is already excluded after examination by government officials).
192 Ho Geun Lee, Jido Deiteo, Ijen Segyewa Gyeongjaeng Haja [Map Data, Let’s Compete with the
World], DIGITAL TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.dt.co.kr/contents.html?article_no=2013092702012
351607001 (S. Kor.).
193 Emma Llansó, Momentum Builds for Brazil’s Internet Rights Law, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://cdt.org/blog/momentum-builds-for-brazil%E2%80%99s-internet-rights-law/.
194 Jon Swartz, NSA Surveillance Hurting Tech Firms’ Business, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2014,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/27/nsa-resistant-products-obama-tech-companies-encryptionoverseas/5290553/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The irony is that such efforts are likely to undermine, not strengthen, the
privacy and security of the information.195 First, localized data servers reduce
the opportunity to distribute information across multiple servers in different
locations. As we have noted above, the information gathered together in one
place offers a tempting jackpot, an ideal target for criminals. As some
computer experts have noted, “Requirements to localize data . . . only make it
impossible for cloud service providers to take advantage of the Internet’s
distributed infrastructure and use sharding and obfuscation on a global
scale.”196 Sharding is the process in which rows of a database table are held
separately in servers across the world—making each partition a “shard” that
provides enough data for operation but not enough to re-identify an
individual.197 “The correct solution,” Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director with
India’s Centre for Internet and Society suggests, “would be to encourage the
creation and use of de-centralised and end-to-end encrypted services that do
not store all your data in one place.”198
Second, as we noted above, the Protected Local Provider offering storage
and processing services may be more likely to have weak security
infrastructure than companies that continuously improve their security to
respond to the ever-growing sophistication of cyberthieves. As a recent cover
feature of the IEEE Computer Society magazine observes, “The most common
threats to data in the cloud involve breaches by hackers against inadequately
protected systems, user carelessness or lack of caution, and engineering
errors.”199 Information technology associations from Europe, Japan, and the
United States have echoed this observation, arguing that “security is a function
of how a product is made, used, and maintained, not by whom or where it is
made.”200 When Australia was contemplating a rule requiring health data to
195 Daniel Castro, The False Promise of Data Nationalism, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (Dec.
2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-false-promise-data-nationalism.pdf (“The notion that data must be stored
domestically to ensure that it remains secure and private is false.”).
196 Patrick S. Ryan, Sarah Falvey & Ronak Merchant, When the Cloud Goes Local: The Global Problem
with Data Localization, COMPUTER, Dec. 2013, at 54, 56.
197 David Geer, Big Data Security, Privacy Concerns Remain Unanswered, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 5,
2013, 22:43), http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=B1920F48-0FD6-A5E7-5685FC364B81ECBB.
198 Rohin Dharmakumar, India’s Internet Privacy Woes, FORBES INDIA (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://forbesindia.com/article/checkin/indias-internet-privacywoes/35971/1#ixzz2r0zriZTF.
199 Ryan, Falvey & Merchant, supra note 196, at 56.
200 Statement, Digital Eur., U.S. Info. Tech. Indus. Council (ITI) & Japan Elecs. & Info. Tech. Indus.
Assoc. (JEITA), Global Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Industry Statement:
Recommended
Government
Approaches
to
Cybersecurity
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.jeita.or.jp/english/topics/2012/0622/release_2012_en.pdf. This idea is echoed in submissions from
a range of IT consortia.

CHANDER_LE GALLEYSPROOFS2

720

2/19/2015 12:30 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:677

remain in the country (a rule that was subsequently implemented), Microsoft
made a similar argument. Microsoft argued that the rule might undermine the
security of Australian health information by limiting consumer choice among
potential providers and wrote, “Consumers should have the ability to
personally control their [personal electronic health records] by choosing to
have their [personal electronic health records] held by an entity not located
within Australia’s territorial boundaries if they believe that entity can provide
to them a service that meets their individual needs.”201
Indeed, countries pushing for data localization themselves are sometimes
hotbeds of cybercrimes. According to experts, “Cyber security is notoriously
weak in Indonesia.”202 Indeed, the nation has been called a “hacker’s
paradise.”203 One 2013 report on Vietnam suggests that “2,045 agency and
business websites were hacked this year, but the number of cyber security
experts was too small to cope with all of them.”204 Another account suggests
that “Brazil is among the main targets of virtual threats such as malware and
phishing.”205 For example, in 2011, hackers stole one billion dollars from
companies in Brazil, as Forbes put it, the “worst prepared nation to adopt
cloud technology.”206 At times, a cybertheft can begin with a domestic
burglary, as in the case of one recent European episode.207 Or cyberthefts can
201 MICROSOFT, PERSONALLY CONTROLLED ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS BILL 2011 – EXPOSURE
DRAFT (Oct. 28, 2011) (on file with Emory Law Journal); see also Richard Chirgwin, Microsoft to Aussie
Gov: Privacy Rules Stifle e-Health, REGISTER (Nov. 25, 2011, 00:01), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2011/11/25/ms_threatens_au_gov_over_ehealth/. An Australian local healthcare provider worried about an
additional problem with the rule: the proliferation of mobile devices among Australians would inevitably result
in information being held overseas as the Australians took these devices abroad; the provider observed,
“Consumers will access their data via mobile devices overseas and this will result in data, de facto, being
accessed and potentially held or cached, outside of Australia.” CSC, supra note 15; see also Taylor, supra note
15 (examining CSC’s submission to Parliament).
202 Jonathan Vit, Hacker’s Paradise or Host Nation? Indonesian Officials Weigh Cyber Threat,
JAKARTAGLOBE (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/hackers-paradise-or-hostnation-indonesian-officials-weigh-cyber-threat/.
203 Id.
204 VN at Risk over Lack of Cyber-Security, VIỆT NAM NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013, 08:42:00),
http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/246923/vn-at-risk-over-lack-of-cyber-security.html.
205 FROST & SULLIVAN, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL: HOW TO REDUCE YOUR RISKS THROUGH IT
INFRASTRUCTURE OUTSOURCING 7 (2012), available at http://www.alog.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/
12/Brazilian_IT_Infrastructure.pdf (emphasis omitted).
206 Ricardo Geromel, Hackers Stole $1 Billion in Brazil, The Worst Prepared Nation to Adopt Cloud
Technology, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ricardogeromel/2012/03/02/
hackers-stole-1billion-in-brazil-the-worst-prepared-nation-to-adopt-cloud-technology/.
207 See Christopher Thompson, Caroline Binham & Jonathan Guthrie, ENRC Warns Hackers May Have
Stolen Sensitive Data, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2013, at 16, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e25863ccc392-11e2-8c30-00144feab7de.html.
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be accomplished with a USB “thumb” drive. In January 2014, information
about more than 100 million South Korean credit cards was stolen, likely
through an “inside job” by a contractor armed with a USB drive.208
Most fundamentally, there is little reason to believe that the personal
information of British Columbians is more secure just because it is stored on a
government computer in Vancouver than one owned by IBM, a few miles
further south.
C. Economic Development
Many governments believe that by forcing companies to localize data
within national borders, they will increase investment at home. Thus, data
localization measures are often motivated, whether explicitly or not, by desires
to promote local economic development. In fact, however, data localization
raises costs for local businesses, reduces access to global services for
consumers, hampers local start-ups, and interferes with the use of the latest
technological advances.
In an Information Age, the global flow of data has become the lifeblood of
economies across the world. While some in Europe have raised concerns about
the transfer of data abroad, the European Commission has recognized “the
critical importance of data flows notably for the transatlantic economy.”209 The
Commission observes that international data transfers “form an integral part of
commercial exchanges across the Atlantic including for new growing digital
businesses, such as social media or cloud computing, with large amounts of
data going from the EU to the US.”210 Worried about the effect of constraints
on data flows on both global information sharing and economic development,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
urged nations to avoid “barriers to the location, access and use of cross-border

208 Choe Sang-Hun, Theft of Data Fuels Worries in South Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/business/international/theft-of-data-fuels-worries-in-south-korea.html;
Joyce Lee, South Koreans Seethe, Sue as Credit Card Details Swiped, REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/21/us-korea-cards-idUSBREA0K05120140121.
209 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning
of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, at 3, COM
(2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_
2013_847_en.pdf.
210 Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, supra note 54, at 2.
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data facilities and functions” when consistent with other fundamental rights, in
order to “ensure cost effectiveness and other efficiencies.”211
The worry about the impact of data localization is widely shared in the
business community as well. The value of the Internet to national economies
has been widely noted.212 Regarding Brazil’s attempt to require data
localization, the Information Technology Industry Council, an industry
association representing more than forty major Internet companies, had argued
that “in-country data storage requirements would detrimentally impact all
economic activity that depends on data flows.”213 The Swedish government
agency, the National Board of Trade, recently interviewed fifteen local
companies of various sizes across sectors and concluded succinctly that “trade
cannot happen without data being moved from one location to another.”214
Data localization, like most protectionist measures, leads only to small
gains for a few local enterprises and workers, while causing significant harms
spread across the entire economy. The domestic benefits of data localization go
to the few owners and employees of data centers and the few companies
servicing these centers locally. Meanwhile, the harms of data localization are
widespread, felt by small, medium, and large businesses that are denied access
to global services that might improve productivity. In response to Russia’s
recently passed localization law, the NGO Russian Association for Electronic
Communications stressed the potential economic consequences, pointing to the
withdrawal of global services and substantial economic losses caused by the
passing of similar laws in other countries.215 For example, besides the loss of
international social media platforms, localization would make it impossible for
211 ORG. FOR ECO. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON PRINCIPLES FOR
INTERNET POLICY-MAKING 7 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49258588.pdf.
212 For more information on the economic impact of the Internet and related technologies, see studies
compiled by VALUE OF THE WEB, http://www.valueoftheweb.com/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
213 Letter from Info. Tech. Indus. Council Brazil, to Members of the Brazilian Nat’l Congress (Oct. 22,
2013), available at https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/files/2013/11/Brazil-Data-Localization-LetterEnglish-Version-for-distribution.pdf. Internet companies in Brazil have largely supported the Marco Civil,
with the significant exception of this particular provision. For a list of members, see Member Companies,
INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, http://www.itic.org/about/member-companies.dot (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
214 KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM [SWED. NAT’L BD. OF TRADE], NO TRANSFER, NO TRADE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER FOR COMPANIES BASED IN SWEDEN 23 (2014), available at
http://www.kommers.se/Documents/dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2014/No_Transfer_No_Trade_webb.pdf.
215 The Russian Association for Electronic Communications stated, “Passing similar laws on the
localization of personal data in other countries has led to withdrawal of global services and substantial
economic losses.” New Russian Law Bans Citizens’ Personal Data Being Held on Foreign Servers, RT (July
5, 2014, 10:50), http://rt.com/politics/170604-russia-personal-data-servers/ (emphasis omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Russians to order airline tickets or consumer goods through online services.
Localization requirements also seriously affect Russian companies like
Aeroflot because the airline depends on foreign ticket-booking systems.216
Critics worried, at the time, that the Brazilian data localization requirement
would “deny[] Brazilian users access to great services that are provided by US
and other international companies.”217 Marilia Marciel, a digital policy expert
at Fundação Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, observes, “Even Brazilian
companies prefer to host their data outside of Brazil.”218 Data localization
affects domestic innovation by denying entrepreneurs the ability to build on
top of global services based abroad. Brasscom, the Brazilian Association of
Information Technology and Communication Companies, argues that such
obligations would “hurt[] the country’s ability to create, innovate, create jobs
and collect taxes from the proper use of the Internet.”219
Governments implementing in-country data mandates imagine that the
various global services used in their country will now build infrastructure
locally. Many services, however, will find it uneconomical and even too risky
to establish local servers in certain territories.220 Data centers are expensive, all
the more so if they have the highest levels of security. One study finds Brazil
to be the most expensive country in the Western hemisphere in which to build
data centers.221 Building a data center in Brazil costs $60.9 million on average,
216

Upper House Obligates Internet Companies to Retain Information on Russians Only in Russia,
SPUTNIK NEWS (July 9, 2014, 16:58), http://sputniknews.com/russia/20140709/190859013/RussianParliament-Passes-Law-Obliging-Russians-to-Store.html.
217 Joe Leahy, Brazilian Move Sparks Furore Over Internet Privacy Bid; User Data Storage, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2013, at 5, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5cd5b638-487a-11e3-823700144feabdc0.html.
218 Esteban Israel & Alonso Soto, Brazil’s Anti-Spying Internet Push Could Backfire, Industry Says,
REUTERS, Oct. 2, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/02/us-brazil-internetidUSBRE9910F120131002 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219 Angelica Mari, New Data Storage Demands May Put Companies Off Brazil, ZDNET (Nov. 4, 2013,
17:18 PST), http://www.zdnet.com/new-data-storage-demands-may-put-companies-off-brazil-7000022790/
(internal quotations marks omitted).
220 See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, DATA CENTRE RISK INDEX (2013), http://www.cushmanwakefield.com/
~/media/global-reports/data-centre-risk-index-2013.pdf.
221 FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 205, at 10; see also Israel & Soto, supra note 218. Brazil has
attempted to address the cost barrier for building local data centers through tax incentives, as part of a
broadband infrastructure program, the Regime Especial de Tributação do Programa Nacional de Banda Larga
(Special Taxation Regime for the Broadband National Program). See Decreto No. 7.921, de 18 de Fevereiro de
2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.], de 18.02.2013 (Braz.), available at http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/
diarios/50903713/dou-secao-1-18-02-2013-pg-2; Brazil Signs Tax Relief Measure for Telecom Network
Construction, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.rcrwireless.com/americas/20130219/
spectrum/brazils-government-signs-decree-relieve-tax-construction-new-telecom-networks/.
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while building one in Chile and the United States costs $51.2 million and $43
million, respectively.222 Operating such a data center remains expensive
because of enormous energy and other expenses—averaging $950,000 in
Brazil, $710,000 in Chile, and $510,000 in the United States each month.223
This cost discrepancy is mostly due to high electricity costs and heavy import
taxes on the equipment needed for the center.224 Data centers employ few
workers, with energy making up three-quarters of the costs of operations.225
According to the 2013 Data Centre Risk Index—a study of thirty countries on
the risks affecting successful data center operations—Australia, Russia, China,
Indonesia, India, and Brazil are among the riskiest countries for running data
centers.226
Not only are there significant economic costs to data localization, the
potential gains are more limited than governments imagine. Data server farms
are hardly significant generators of employment, populated instead by
thousands of computers and few human beings. The significant initial outlay
they require is largely in capital goods, the bulk of which is often imported into
a country. The diesel generators, cooling systems, servers, and power supply
devices tend to be imported from global suppliers.227 Ironically, it is often
American suppliers of servers and other hardware that stand to be the
beneficiaries of data localization mandates.228 One study notes, “Brazilian
suppliers of components did not benefit from this [data localization
requirement], since the imported products dominate the market.”229 By
increasing capital purchases from abroad, data localization requirements can in
fact increase merchandise trade deficits. Furthermore, large data farms are

222 Loretta Chao & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil Legislators Bear Down on Internet Bill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13,
2013, 6:45 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579194290325348688
(according to a government-commissioned study seen by The Wall Street Journal).
223 Id.
224 See FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 205, at 10; Israel & Soto, supra note 218.
225 See RACHEL A. DINES, FORRESTER RESEARCH, INC., BUILD OR BUY? THE ECONOMICS OF DATA
CENTER FACILITIES (2011), available at https://www.forrester.com/Build+Or+Buy+The+Economics+
Of+Data+Center+Facilities/-/E-WEB7855.
226 CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 220, at 7.
227 FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 205, at 10.
228 Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Server Shipments Market Grew 1.3 Percent in the
Second Quarter of 2014 While Revenue Increased 2.8 Percent (Aug. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2833020 (noting that US multinational HP, IBM, Dell, Oracle, and
Cisco together make up about 76.4 percent of the server market share during the second quarter of 2014).
229 Brazil Data Center Power Supplies Market Size Report by Frost & Sullivan, INFOTECH LEAD (Dec. 12,
2013), http://infotechlead.com/2013/12/12/brazil-data-center-power-supplies-market-size-report-frostsullivan/.
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enormous consumers of energy,230 and thus often further burden overtaxed
energy grids. They thereby harm other industries that must now compete for
this energy, paying higher prices while potentially suffering limitations in
supply of already scarce power.
Cost, as well as access to the latest innovations, drives many e-commerce
enterprises in Indonesia to use foreign data centers. Daniel Tumiwa, head of
the Indonesian E-Commerce Association (IdEA), states that “[t]he cost can
double easily in Indonesia.”231 Indonesia’s Internet start-ups have accordingly
often turned to foreign countries such as Australia, Singapore, or the United
States to host their services. One report suggests that “many of the ‘tools’ that
start-up online media have relied on elsewhere are not fully available yet in
Indonesia.”232 The same report also suggests that a weak local hosting
infrastructure in Indonesia means that sites hosted locally experience delayed
loading time.233 Similarly, as the Vietnamese government attempts to foster
entrepreneurship and innovation,234 localization requirements effectively bar
start-ups from utilizing cheap and powerful platforms abroad and potentially
handicap Vietnam from “join[ing] in the technology race.”235
Governments worried about transferring data abroad at the same time hope,
somewhat contradictorily, to bring foreign data within their borders. Many
countries seek to become leaders in providing data centers for companies
operating across their regions. In 2010, Malaysia announced its Economic
Transformation Program236 to transform Malaysia into a world-class data

230 In 2013, datacenters in the United States consumed the equivalent of 34 large (500-megwatt) coal-fired
power plants total annual output. NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, DATA CENTER EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT 5
(2014), http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/data-center-efficiency-assessment-IP.pdf.
231 Avi Tejo Bhaskoro, Indonesia Ministry Still Insists on Local Data Centers for Online Companies,
DAILYSOCIAL (May 8, 2013, 16:28:27), http://en.dailysocial.net/post/indonesian-ministry-still-insists-on-localdata-centers-for-online-companies (internal quotation marks omitted).
232 Ross Settles, Indonesia: A Hotbed of Innovative Online Publishing Start-ups, CLICKZ (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/2281593/indonesia-a-hotbed-of-innovative-online-publishing-startups.
233 See id.
234 On June 4, 2013, the Ministry of Science and Technology launched the Silicon Valley Project to
stimulate the growth of technology startups in Vietnam. See VIETNAM SILICON VALLEY PROJECT,
http://www.siliconvalley.com.vn/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
235 See Elisabeth Rosen, Can Vietnam Create the Next Silicon Valley, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2014, 5:43 PM
ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/can-vietnam-create-the-next-silicon-valley/
283760/.
236 Overview of ETP, ECON. TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMME, http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/About_ETP-@Overview_of_ETP.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
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center hub for the Asia-Pacific region.237 Brazil hopes to accomplish the same
for Latin America, while France seeks to stimulate its economy via a “Made in
France” digital industry.238 Instead of spurring local investment, data
localization can lead to the loss of investment. First, there’s the retaliation
effect. Would countries send data to Brazil if Brazil declares that data is unsafe
if sent abroad? Brasscom notes that the Brazilian Internet industry’s growth
would be hampered if other countries engage in similar reactive policies,
which “can stimulate the migration of datacenters based here, or at least part of
them, to other countries.”239 Some in the European Union sympathize with this
concern. European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, has
expressed similar doubts, worrying about the results for European global
competitiveness if each country has its own separate Internet.240 Then there’s
the avoidance effect. Rio de Janeiro State University Law Professor Ronaldo
Lemos, who helped write the original Marco Civil and is currently Director of
the Rio Institute for Technology and Society, warns that the localization
provision would have caused foreign companies to avoid the country
altogether: “It could end up having the opposite effect to what is intended, and
scare away companies that want to do business in Brazil.”241 Indeed, such
burdensome local laws often lead companies to launch overseas, in order to try
to avoid these rules entirely. Foreign companies, too, might well steer clear of
the country in order to avoid entanglement with cumbersome rules. For
example, Yahoo!, while very popular in Vietnam, places its servers for the

237 EPP 3: Positioning Malaysia as a World-class Data Centre Hub, ECON. TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAMME, http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/Business_Services-@-Business_Services_-_EPP_3-;_Positioning_
Malaysia_As_A_World-class_Data_Centre_Hub.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); see also Edwin Yapp,
Malaysia’s Data Center Ambition Faces Challenges, ZDNET (Apr. 28, 2011, 10:40 GMT),
http://www.zdnet.com/malaysias-data-center-ambition-faces-challenges-2062208606/ (“Malaysia has the
geographical stability to meet this [growing cloud computing] need.”); Edwin Yapp, Malaysia Must Fulfil
Promises to Boost ICT, ZDNET (Oct. 18, 2010, 10:20 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/malaysia-must-fulfilpromises-to-boost-ict-2062203784/.
238 See NEW FACE OF INDUSTRY, supra note 63, at 1; Press Release, Invest in Fr. Agency, The Growing
Market for Cloud Computing in France (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.invest-infrance.org/Medias/Publications/1588/cloud-computing-in-France-January-2012.pdf.
239 Mari, supra note 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).
240 See Chiponda Chimbelu, No Welcome for Deutsche Telekom National Internet Plans from EU
Commission, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.dw.de/no-welcome-for-deutsche-telekomnational-internet-plans-from-eu-commission/a-17219111.
241 Israel & Soto, supra note 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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country in Singapore.242 In these ways we see that data localization mandates
can backfire entirely, leading to avoidance instead of investment.
Data localization requirements place burdens on domestic enterprises not
faced by those operating in more liberal jurisdictions. Countries that require
data to be cordoned off complicate matters for their own enterprises, which
must turn to domestic services if they are to comply with the law. Such
companies must also develop mechanisms to segregate the data they hold by
the nationality of the data subject. The limitations may impede development of
new, global services. Critics argue that South Korea’s ban on the export of
mapping data, for example, impedes the development of next-generation
services in Korea: Technology services, such as Google Glass, driverless cars,
and information programs for visually-impaired users, are unlikely to develop
and grow in Korea. Laws made in the 1960s are preventing many venture
enterprises from advancing to foreign markets via location/navigation
services.243
The harms of data localization for local businesses are not restricted to
Internet enterprises or to consumers denied access to global services. As it
turns out, most of the economic benefits from Internet technologies accrue to
traditional businesses. A McKinsey study estimates that about seventy-five
percent of the value added created by the Internet and data flow is in traditional
industries, in part through increases in productivity.244 The potential economic
impact across the major sectors—healthcare, manufacturing, electricity, urban
infra-structure, security, agriculture, retail, etc.—is estimated at $2.7 to
$6.2 trillion per year.245 This is particularly important for emerging economies,
in which traditional industries remain predominant. The Internet raises profits
as well, due to increased revenues, lower costs of goods sold, and lower
administrative costs.246 With data localization mandates, traditional businesses

242 Thu Huong, VN Digital Content Firms Find Home Disadvantage, VIỆT NAM NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/business-beat/180617/vn-digital-content-firms-find-home-disadvantage.html
(noting that Yahoo!’s servers serving Vietnam are based in Singapore).
243 See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text.
244 MATTHIEU PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S
SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS, AND PROSPERITY 22
(2011),
available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/internet_matters.
245 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT
WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 55 (2013), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/disruptive_technologies.
246 See PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 244, at 17.
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will lose access to the many global services that would store or process
information offshore.
Data localization requirements also interfere with the most important trends
in computing today. They limit access to the disruptive technologies of the
future, such as cloud computing, the “Internet of Things,” and data-driven
innovations (especially those relying on “big data”). Data localization
sacrifices the innovations made possible by building on top of global Internet
platforms based on cloud computing. This is particularly important for
entrepreneurs operating in emerging economies that might lack the
infrastructure already developed elsewhere. And it places great impediments to
the development of both the Internet of Things and big data analytics, requiring
costly separation of data by political boundaries and often denying the
possibility of aggregating data across borders. We discuss the impacts on these
trends below.
Cloud Computing. Data localization requirements will often prevent access
to global cloud computing services. As we have indicated, while governments
assume that global services will simply erect local data server farms, such
hopes are likely to prove unwarranted. Thus, local companies will be denied
access to the many companies that might help them scale up, or to go global.247
Many companies around the world are built on top of existing global services.
Highly successful companies with Indian origins such as Slideshare and Zoho
relied on global services such as Amazon Web Services and Google Apps.248 A
Slideshare employee cites the scalability made possible by the use of
Amazon’s cloud services, noting, “Sometimes I need 100 servers, sometimes I
only need 10.”249 A company like Zoho can use Google Apps, while at the
same time competing with Google in higher value-added services.250
247

Whether the transfer of information to a cloud service hosted abroad triggers a local privacy law
obligation will depend on how the law is interpreted. One report suggests that in Australia, “under the
[infrastructure as a service] model . . . the data is not usually ‘transferred’ to a third party (ie [sic] the
vendor),” and thus does not trigger a data transfer obligation, while the software as a service model (SaaS)
might well trigger such an obligation. ALEC CHRISTIE, DLA PIPER CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE NEW
AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW (2013), http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/3ecfb49d-c14a-4fab-964544d61829f2b1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/21860e03-439b-43a2-9a44-45746fdd65e1/Cloud%20
Computing%20and%20the%20new%20Australian%20Privacy%20Law.pdf.
248 JONATHAN BOUTELLE, SLIDESHARE, HOW SLIDESHARE USES AMAZON WEB SERVICES (2010),
available at http://www.slideshare.net/jboutelle/slideshare-aws-talk; Alex Williams, Zoho Integrates Google
Apps and Keeps Step with the Giants, READWRITE (Dec. 2, 2009), http://readwrite.com/2009/12/01/
zoho#awesm=~otx2zoOOYtio6Y.
249 Boutelle, supra note 248, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250 Williams, supra note 248.
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Accessing such global services thus allows a small company to maintain a
global presence without having to deploy the vast infrastructure that would be
necessary to scale as needed.
The Internet of Things. As the world shifts to Internet-connected devices,
data localization will require data flows to be staunched at national borders,
requiring expensive and cumbersome national infrastructures for such devices.
This erodes the promise of the Internet of Things—where everyday objects and
our physical surroundings are Internet-enabled and connected—for both
consumers and businesses. Consumer devices include wearable technologies
that “measure some sort of detail about you, and log it.”251 Devices such as
Sony’s Smartband allied with a Lifelog application to track and analyze both
physical movements and social interactions252 or the Fitbit253 device from an
innovative start-up suggest the revolutionary possibilities for both large and
small manufacturers. The connected home and wearable computing devices are
becoming increasingly important consumer items.254 A heart monitoring
system collects data from patients and physicians around the world and uses
the anonymized data to advance cardiac care.255 Such devices collect data for
analysis typically on the company’s own or outsourced computer servers,
which could be located anywhere across the world. Over this coming decade,
the Internet of Things is estimated to generate $14.4 trillion in value that is “up
for grabs” for global enterprises.256 Companies are also adding Internet sensors
not just to consumer products but to their own equipment and facilities around
the world through RFID tags or through other devices. The oil industry has
embraced what has come to be known as the “digital oil field,” where real-time

251

Samuel Gibbs & Charles Arthur, CES 2014: Why Wearable Technology is the New Dress Code,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2014, 03.29 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/08/wearabletechnology-consumer-electronics-show.
252 Lifelog, SONY, http://www.sonymobile.com/global-en/apps-services/lifelog/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
253 Who We Are, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/about (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
254 See Dan Rowinski, CES 2014: Connected Homes and Wearables to Take Center Stage, READWRITE
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://readwrite.com/2014/01/03/ces-2014-preview-wearable-technology-4k-tv-connectedhome-smartphones-tablets.
255 See Why Use It, ALIVECOR, http://www.alivecor.com/why-use-it (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
256 JOSEPH BRADLEY, JOEL BARBIER & DOUG HANDLER, CISCO, EMBRACING THE INTERNET OF
EVERYTHING TO CAPTURE YOUR SHARE OF $14.4 TRILLION 3 (2013), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/
ac79/docs/innov/IoE_Economy.pdf. This is the reported “Value at Stake—the combination of increased
revenues and lower costs that is created or will migrate among companies and industries from 2013 to 2022.”
Id. at 1.
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data is collected and analyzed remotely.257 While data about oil flows would
hardly constitute personal information, such data might be controlled under
laws protecting sensitive national security information. The Internet of Things
shows the risks of data localization for consumers, who may be denied access
to many of the best services the world has to offer. It also shows the risk of
data localization for companies seeking to better monitor their systems around
the world.
Data Driven Innovation (Big Data). Many analysts believe that data-driven
innovations will be a key basis of competition, innovation, and productivity in
the years to come, though many note the importance of protecting privacy in
the process of assembling ever-larger databases.258 McKinsey even reclassifies
data as a new kind of factor of production for the Information Age.259 Data
localization threatens big data in at least two ways. First, by limiting data
aggregation by country, it increases costs and adds complexity to the collection
and maintenance of data. Second, data localization requirements can reduce the
size of potential data sets, eroding the informational value that can be gained
by cross-jurisdictional studies. Large-scale, global experiments technically
possible through big data analytics, especially on the web, may have to give
way to narrower, localized studies. Perhaps anonymization will suffice to
comport with data localization laws and thus still permit cross-border data
flow, but this will depend on the specifics of the law.
D. Domestic Law Enforcement
Governments have an obligation to protect their citizens, including both
preventing harms and punishing those who have committed crimes.
Widespread fear of terrorist attacks in particular has led some countries to
widen surveillance efforts. The United States expanded its surveillance
authority in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks with the USA PATRIOT
Act260 and then subsequently with other measures such as the Foreign
257 Jessica Leber, Big Oil Goes Mining for Big Data, MIT TECH. REV. (May 8, 2012),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427876/big-oil-goes-mining-for-big-data/ (“At Chevron, it’s the
‘i-field.’ BP has the ‘Field of the Future,’ and Royal Dutch Shell likes ‘Smart Fields.’”).
258 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION,
COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 13 (2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_
data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation.
259 Id. at 3.
260 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, 115 Stat. 272, 278–96 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Sections 202 and 217 of the Act clarify that law
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Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008.261 After the
2008 Mumbai attack in which the terrorists used BlackBerry devices, the
Indian government sought access to telecommunications providers’ data and
asked certain telecommunications providers to locate their servers in India to
facilitate access to data by law enforcement.262 More recently, after the
revelations of widespread NSA spying, the Internet Service Providers
Association of India, which represents India’s domestic Internet Service
Providers, asked the government to require foreign internet companies to offer
services in that country through local servers, citing concerns for their
consumers’ privacy.263 France just recently adopted the law on military
programming permitting certain ministries to see “electronic and digital
communications” in “real time.”264 While in Vietnam, government officials
justify Decree 72 as necessary for law enforcement, including the enforcement
of copyright laws regarding news publications and aiding investigation of
defamation on social networks.265

enforcement may seek to intercept electronic communications of “computer trespassers,” Section 210 expands
the type of information that law enforcement may obtain from Internet Service Providers, Section 211 expands
law enforcement’s surveillance and investigatory power to cable internet services, and Section 216 simplified
the usage authorization of pen registers and trace devices to require only a single court order in order to use
these devices on any computer or facility anywhere in the country. For a general discussion of the expanding
surveillance, see MARCIA S. SMITH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31289, THE INTERNET AND THE USA
PATRIOT ACT: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC PRIVACY, SECURITY, COMMERCE, AND
GOVERNMENT (2002), available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL31289.pdf.
261 Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101(a)(2), § 702(a), 122 Stat. 2436, 2437–38 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a (2012)) (empowering the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize
surveillance targeting foreign persons and organizations abroad).
262 Praveen Dalal, Big Brother Must Not Overstep the Limits, TEHELKA.COM (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.tehelka.com/big-brother-must-not-overstep-the-limits/ (“Encryption-based service providers such
as Research In Motion have been forced to establish servers in India and allow access to messenger services to
intelligence agencies in plain, unencrypted form. Nokia has also established a server in India to facilitate law
enforcement and intelligence agencies’ interception demands.”); Noah Shachtman, How Gadgets Helped
Mumbai Attackers, WIRED (Dec. 1, 2008, 6:39 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/12/the-gagdetsof/.
263 Vikas SN, Foreign Internet Companies May Be Asked to Setup Local Servers in India, MEDIANAMA
(June 10, 2013), http://www.medianama.com/2013/06/223-foreign-internet-companies-may-be-asked-to-setuplocal-servers-in-india/; Thomas K. Thomas, Indian Net Firms Want Google, Facebook to Go “Local,” HINDU
BUS. LINE (June 8, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/info-tech/indian-netfirms-want-google-facebook-to-go-local/article4795367.ece.
264 Loi 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à
2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale [Law No. 2013-1168 of
December 18, 2013 on the Military Budget for the Years 2014–2019 and Miscellaneous Provisions for
Defense and National Security], art. 20, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 19, 2013, p. 20570 (Fr.).
265 Nguyen, supra note 166.
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After a draft of this paper was made available online, we learned that the
United States government has, on occasion, exercised its authority to review
foreign investments into United States telecommunications infrastructure to
require data localization from some of the telecommunications companies.266
The obligations seem to have arisen as part of the informal “Team Telecom”
review of such investments. Team Telecom consists in representatives from the
Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security, as well as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.267 The inconsistent and varying nature of
these obligations—sometimes requiring only prior notice for the use of a
foreign service and other times requiring data storage in the United States—
suggests that the law enforcement needs are exaggerated. There is no reason to
suspect that a criminal is more likely to use one telecommunications provider
over another.
Equally important, it seems unlikely that data localization will prove an
effective means to ensure that data about their residents is available to law
enforcement personnel when they want it. Moreover, other alternatives are
reasonably available to assist law enforcement access to data—alternatives that
are both less trade restrictive and more speech-friendly than data localization.
Data localization will not necessarily provide law enforcement better
access to a criminal’s data trail because localization requirements are
extremely hard to enforce. They might simply end up driving potential
wrongdoers abroad to less compliant and more secretive services. Indeed, the
most law-abiding companies will follow costly data localization rules, while
others will simply ignore them, comforted by the knowledge that such laws are
difficult to enforce. Any success with gaining information from these
companies will likely prove temporary, as, over time, potential scofflaws will
become aware of the monitoring and turn to services that intentionally skirt the
law. The services avoiding the law will likely be foreign ones, lacking any
266 See, e.g., Network Security Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
U.S. Dep’t of Def., and Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. § 2.5 (2011), available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/
US-NSAs/US-NSAs-Level3.pdf (requiring that data and communications be stored exclusively in the United
States); Network Security Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and
TerreStar Corp. § 2.4 (2009), available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs/US-NSAs-TerreStar.pdf
(requiring that data and communications be made available in the United States); Network Security Agreement
between U.S. Dep’t of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, AT&T Corp., British
Telecomm. PLC, TNV (Neth.) BV, VLT Co. LLC, and Violet License Co. LLC § 2.5.2 (1999), available at
https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs/US-NSAs-ATT.pdf (requiring that prior notice be given to the
U.S. Department of Justice before transfer of information abroad).
267 See Spencer E. Ante & Ryan Knutson, U.S. Tightens Grip on Telecom, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324906304579037292831912078.
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personnel or assets on the ground against which to enforce any sanction. Thus,
understood dynamically, the data localization requirement will only hamper
local and law-abiding enterprises, while driving some citizens abroad.
Law enforcement is, without doubt, a laudable goal, so long as the laws
themselves do not violate universal human rights. Many governments already
have authority under their domestic laws to compel a company operating in
their jurisdictions to share data of their nationals held by that company abroad.
A recent study of ten countries concluded that the government already had the
right to access data held extraterritorially in the cloud in every jurisdiction
examined.268 Although the process varied, “every single country . . . vests
authority in the government to require a Cloud service provider to disclose
customer data in certain situations, and in most instances this authority enables
the government to access data physically stored outside the country’s
borders.”269
Even if companies refuse to comply with such orders, or if the local
subsidiary lacks the authority to compel its foreign counterpart to share
personal data, governments can resort to information-sharing agreements. For
example, the Convention on Cybercrime, which has been ratified by forty-four
countries including the United States, France, and Germany,270 obliges
Member States to adopt and enforce laws against cybercrimes and to provide
“mutual assistance” to each other in enforcing cyberoffenses.271 Many states
have entered into specific Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with
foreign nations. These treaties establish a process that protects the rights of
268

HOGAN LOVELLS WHITE PAPER, supra note 188, at 2–3.
Id. at 2–3 (emphasis omitted). The study examines the laws of the following countries: Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Id. at 3.
270 Members to the Convention on Cybercrime include the following European countries: Albania,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom; and the following non-European countries: Australia, Dominican Republic, Japan, Mauritius,
Panama, United States. Status of the Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/print/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG (last updated Feb. 7,
2015).
271 Convention on Cybercrime art. 25(1), Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,174, E.T.S. No. 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (“The Parties shall afford one another mutual
assistance to the widest extent possible for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal
offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal
offence.”).
269
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individuals yet gives governments access to data held in foreign jurisdictions.
Currently, the United States has MLATs in force with fifty-six countries.272
The United States also entered into a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement
(MLAA) with China and Taiwan.273 All the countries discussed in the country
studies above, with the exception of Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, have
MLAT arrangements in force with the United States. Generally, MLATs
“specify which types of requested assistance must be provided, and which may
be refused.”274 Requests for assistance may be refused typically when the
execution of such request would be prejudicial to the state’s security or public
interest; the request relates to a political offense; there is an absence of
reasonable grounds; the request does not conform to the MLAT’s provisions;
or the request is incompatible with the requested state’s law.275 The
explanatory notes to the MLAT between the United States and the European
Union observe that a request for data shall only be denied on data protection
grounds in “exceptional cases.”276 At the same time, there are procedural
requirements to help ensure that the information gathering is supporting a
proper governmental investigation. For example, Article 17 of the U.S.–
Germany MLAT provides that the government requesting assistance must do

272 2 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 20
(2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185866.pdf (“[MLATs] are in force with the
following countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium,
Belize, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece,
Grenada, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Kingdom of the Netherlands (including Aruba, Bonaire,
Curacao, Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Maarten), Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia,
St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom (including the Isle of Man,
Cayman Islands, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos), Uruguay, and
Venezuela.”).
273 2012
INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm (showing that in addition to MLATs, the United
States has a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) with “China, as well as a MLAA between the
American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United
States”).
274 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, USING MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES (MLATS) TO IMPROVE
CROSS-BORDER LAWFUL INTERCEPT PROCEDURES 3 (2012), http://www.iccindiaonline.org/policystatement/3.pdf.
275 THE ALLEGED TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL: THE SECOND BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
SEMINAR 372–73 (Richard D. Atkins ed., 1995).
276 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of
America, note on art. 9(2)(b), June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.1, 2003 O.J. 34; see also HOGAN LOVELLS
WHITE PAPER, supra note 188, at 4.
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so in writing and must specify the evidence or information sought, authorities
involved, applicable criminal law provisions, etc.277
An effective MLAT process gives governments the ability to gather
information held on servers across the world. The International Chamber of
Commerce has recognized the crucial role of MLATs in facilitating the lawful
interception of cross-border data flow and stressed the need to focus on
MLATs instead of localization measures.278 Similarly, the European
Commission has recently stressed that the rebuilding of trust in the U.S.–E.U.
relationship must focus in part on a commitment to use legal frameworks such
as the MLATs.279 Mutual cooperation arrangements are far more likely to
prove effective in the long run to support government information gathering
efforts than efforts to confine information within national borders.
E. Freedom
Information control is central to the survival of authoritarian regimes. Such
regimes require the suppression of adverse information in order to maintain
their semblance of authority. This is because “even authoritarian governments
allege a public mandate to govern and assert that the government is acting in
the best interests of the people.”280 Information that disturbs the claim of a
popular mandate and a beneficent government is thus to be eliminated at all
costs. Opposition newspapers or television is routinely targeted, with licenses
revoked or printing presses confiscated. The Internet has made this process of
information control far more difficult by giving many dissidents the ability to
use services based outside the country to share information. The Internet has
made it harder, though not impossible, for authoritarian regimes to suppress
their citizens from both sharing and learning information.281 Data localization
will erode that liberty-enhancing feature of the Internet.
The end result of data localization is to bring information increasingly
under the control of the local authorities, regardless of whether that was
originally intended. The dangers inherent in this are plain. Take the following
cases. The official motivation for the Iranian Internet, as set forth by Iran’s
277 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Ger., art. 17, Oct. 14, 2003, T.I.A.S.
No. 09-1018.
278 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 274, at 6.
279 Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, supra note 54, at 8.
280 Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011).
281 See, e.g., Dong Le, China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Say, BBC (Oct. 4,
2013, 12:46 ET), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957.
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head of economic affairs Ali Aghamohammadi, was to create an Internet that is
“a genuinely halal network, aimed at Muslims on an ethical and moral level,”
which is also safe from cyberattacks (like Stuxnet) and dangers posed by using
foreign networks.282 However, human rights activists believe that “based on
[the country’s] track record, obscenity is just a mask to cover the government’s
real desire: to stifle dissent and prevent international communication.”283 An
Iranian journalist agreed, “[t]his is a ploy by the regime,” which will “only
allow[] [Iranians] to visit permitted websites.”284 More recently, even Iran’s
Culture Minister Ali Janati acknowledged this underlying motivation: “We
cannot restrict the advance of [such technology] under the pretext of protecting
Islamic values.”285
Well aware of this possibility, Internet companies have sought at times to
place their servers outside the country in order to avoid the information held
therein being used to target dissidents. Consider one example: when it began
offering services in Vietnam, Yahoo! made the decision to use servers outside
the country, perhaps to avoid becoming complicit in that country’s surveillance
regime.286 This provides important context for the new Vietnamese decree
mandating local accessibility of data. While the head of the Ministry of
Information’s Online Information Section defends Decree 72 as
“misunderstood” and consistent with “human rights commitments,”287 the
Committee to Protect Journalists worries that this decree will require “both
local and foreign companies that provide Internet services . . . to reveal the
identities of users who violate numerous vague prohibitions against certain
speech in Vietnamese law.”288 As Phil Robertson of Human Rights Watch
argues, “This is a law that has been established for selective persecution. This

282 Christopher Rhoads & Farnaz Fassihi, Iran Vows to Unplug Internet, WALL ST. J., May 28–29, 2011,
at A1, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704889404576277391449002016.
283 Jillian C. York, Is Iran’s Halal Internet Possible?, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 2, 2012, 08:18),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210263735487349.html.
284 See Government Blocks Google and Gmail, While Promoting National Internet, REPS. WITHOUT
BORDERS (Sept. 24, 2012), http://en.rsf.org/iran-islamic-republic-poised-to-launch-21-09-2012,43431.html.
285 Iran’s Culture Minister to Loosen Internet Restrictions, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 2, 2014),
http://www.dw.de/irans-culture-minister-to-loosen-internet-restrictions/a-17468301 (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286 See Huong, supra note 242 (noting that Yahoo!’s servers serving Vietnam are based in Singapore).
287 Vietnam Rebuffs Criticism of ‘Misunderstood’ Web Decree, REUTERS, Aug. 6, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/06/vietnam-internet-idUSL4N0G72IA20130806 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
288 Decree Targets Online Freedoms in Vietnam, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (July 22, 2013),
http://cpj.org/2013/07/decree-targets-online-freedoms-in-vietnam.php.
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is a law that will be used against certain people who have become a thorn in
the side of the authorities in Hanoi.”289
Data localization efforts in liberal societies thus offer cover for more
pernicious efforts by authoritarian states. When Brazil’s government proposed
a data localization mandate, a civil society organization focused on cultural
policies compared the measure to the goals of China and Iran:

Translated, this reads as follows: “Understand this: storing data in-country is
the Internet dream of China, Iran, and other totalitarian countries, but it is
IMPOSSIBLE #MarcoCivil.”290
Thus, perhaps the most pernicious and long-lasting effect of data
localization regulations is the template and precedent they offer to continue
and enlarge such controls. When liberal nations decry efforts to control
information by authoritarian regimes, the authoritarian states will cite our own
efforts to bring data within national control. If liberal states can cite security,
privacy, law enforcement, and social economic reasons to justify data controls,
so can authoritarian states. Of course, the Snowden revelations of widespread
U.S. surveillance will themselves justify surveillance efforts by other states.
For example, Russia has begun to use NSA surveillance to justify increasing
control over companies such as Facebook and Google.291 Such rules have led
critics to worry about increasing surveillance powers of the Russian state.292
Critics caution, “In the future, Russia may even succeed in splintering the web,
289 William Gallo & Tra Mi, New Vietnam Law Bans News Stories from Social Media Sites, VOICE OF
AM. (Aug. 2, 2013, 8:08 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/new-vietnam-law-bans-news-stories-fromsocial-media-sites/1722190.html.
290 See Mega Sim, TWITTER (July 20, 2013, 10:13 AM), https://twitter.com/mega_sim/status/
358643253043662848. This tweet was last accessed on February 6, 2015.
291 Kramer, supra note 119.
292 Andrew Soldatov & Irina Borogan, Russia’s Surveillance State, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 2013, at 23,
available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Russia-surveillance.
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breaking off from the global Internet a Russian intranet that’s easier for it to
control.”293 Even though officials describe such rules as being antiterrorist,
others see a more sinister motive. The editor of Agentura.ru, Andrei Soldatov,
believes that Zheleznyak’s proposal is motivated by the government’s desire to
control internal dissent.294 Ivan Begtin, the director of the group Information
Culture, echoes this, arguing that Zheleznyak’s surveillance power “will be yet
another tool for controlling the Internet.”295 Begtin warns, “In fact, we are
moving very fast down the Chinese path.”296
Finally, creating a poor precedent for more authoritarian countries to
emulate is not the only impact on liberty of data localization by liberal states.
Even liberal states have used surveillance to undermine the civil rights of their
citizens and residents.297 The proposal for a German “Internetz” has drawn
worries that national routing would require deep packet inspection, raising
fears of extensive surveillance.298 The newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine
argues that not only would a state-sanctioned network provide “no help against
spying,” it would lead to “a centralization of surveillance capabilities” for
German spy agencies.299 India’s proposed localization measures in
combination with the various surveillance systems in play—including
Aadhaar, CMS, National Intelligence Grid (Natgrid), and Netra—have raised
concerns for human rights, including freedom of expression.300

293

Id. at 24.
Alec Luhn, Moscow’s Reaction to Snowden Revelations: Relocate Servers to Russia, NATION (July 16,
2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/175292/moscows-reaction-snowden-revelations-relocate-serversrussia.
295 Makutina, supra note 119.
296 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
297 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of
COINTELPRO and Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1059–60 (2002).
298 Richard Adhikari, Deutsche Telekom Pitches NSA-Free German Internet, TECH NEWS WORLD
(Oct. 26, 2013, 5:00 AM PT), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/79286.html. On deep packet inspection,
see Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen & Chris Lewis, Just Deliver the Packets, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF
CAN., http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2009/ledeen-lewis_200903_e.asp (last modified
Mar. 25, 2009).
299 Alex Evans, Can Germany Really Keep Bytes Within Its Borders?, LOCAL (Nov. 29, 2013, 10:10
GMT), http://www.thelocal.de/20131129/german-email-providers-unite-german-internet-against-nsa (internal
quotation marks omitted).
300 India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 7, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights (“Indian activists have
raised concerns that the CMS will inhibit them from expressing their opinions and sharing information.”);
Maria Xynou, India’s ‘Big Brother’: The Central Monitoring System (CMS), CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y (Apr. 8,
2013), http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-big-brother-the-central-monitoring-system (“The
overall function of the CMS project and its use of data collected should be thoroughly examined on a legal and
294
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In addition to concerns regarding human rights violations based on
surveillance and censorship, data localization measures also interfere with the
freedom of expression—particular the “freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontier[].”301 Preventing
citizens from using foreign political forums because such use might cause
personal data to be stored or processed abroad might interfere with an
individuals’ right to knowledge.302 Armed with the ability to block information
from going out and to filter the information coming in, data location
consolidates power in governments by making available an infrastructure for
surveillance and censorship.
CONCLUSION
Governments have the right and also the responsibility to insist on the
privacy and security of the data of their residents as it crosses borders. They
have a variety of tools available to achieve these goals, including contract
clauses that commit companies to high security and privacy standards, audits
and certifications of foreign suppliers, protections available in the local laws of
the foreign suppliers, and adherence to international agreements and standards
on such issues, as well as reputational sanctions.303 Efforts to force data
localization distract from efforts to create better protections for individuals
across the world. We must insist on data protection without data protectionism.
A better, safer Internet for everyone should not require breaking it apart.

policy level prior to its operation, as its current vagueness and excessive control over communications can
create a potential for unprecedented abuse.”).
301 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2), opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976); see also Molly Land, Toward an International Law of
the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393, 438 (2013).
302 See Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2009) (reconceptualizing the
access to knowledge movement with the human rights movement in the face of increasing government
regulations).
303 The European Union’s Article 29 Working Party opined in 2012 that risk assessment and contractual
safeguards (including auditing) were the appropriate means to ensure responsible use of cloud computing
services. Opinion 05/2012 of the Article 29 Working Party on Cloud Computing (July 1, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp
196_en.pdf. ISO 27001 is a well-accepted international standard for Information Security Management
Systems. ISO/IEC 27001:2005, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_27001:2005 (last modified
Feb. 4, 2015).

